pakistan’s

High-Level Diplomacy and Exchanges
The constant exchange of high-level visits has played a vital role in strengthening relations
between Pakistan and China. Dictated by the compulsions of regional diplomacy, however,
visits to Pakistan by Chinese leaders have been balanced with visits to India. Chinese vice
foreign minister Wang Yi, while on a visit to Pakistan in December 2007, sought to dispel any
impression in Islamabad that this balancing of visits signaled a shit in policy. He praised the
efforts of Musharraf and the Pakistani government for promoting regional peace and stability
and emphasized that, regardless of any change in Pakistan’s domestic situation, the “all-weather
friendship” would continue to deepen. 19
Chinese leaders have been prominent in projecting the image of their strong partnership.
Chinese premier Li Keqiang, during his visit to Pakistan in 2013, stated that “as the closest friend
and brother of Pakistan, China will render support and assistance as our ability permits. To help
you is to help ourselves.” He also said that the countries’ “all-weather friendship and all-round
cooperation…have stood the test of the changing global environment and set a fine example
for the growth of state-to-state relations.” 20 This assertion clearly indicates the interdependency
in the relationship and highlights that its importance for China’s new regime under Xi Jinping
remains unchanged.
The Role of Kashmir in the China-Pakistan Relationship
China’s stance on Kashmir is closely tied to China-Pakistan relations. Pakistan, India, and
China all have competing claims along the borders of Kashmir, and over the years China has
extended its influence in portions of Kashmir with the support of its ally Pakistan.
China’s position on the India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir has been through three phases.
In the mid-1950s, China adopted a pro-Indian position, with Beijing conceding that Kashmir had
acceded to India. In the early 1960s, however, it shited toward a pro-Pakistan stance of supporting
the right of self-determination for Kashmiris. In its third phase, China’s official position is now that
India and Pakistan should peacefully resolve the dispute on the basis of the UN resolutions and
agreements signed by the two sides in this regard. The Chinese media coverage of developments
in Kashmir, however, mainly highlights the Pakistani point of view that the Kashmiris should
be allowed their right to self-determination and that a free and impartial election should be held
under UN auspices. Although mentioning that bilateral agreements between India and Pakistan
should also form the basis of a solution to the Kashmir dispute, China has carefully avoided
specific reference to the Simla Agreement, which formally established the Line of Control in 1972.
A major step in the China-Pakistan relationship was taken in 1963, when leaders signed the
Sino-Pakistan Agreement establishing the border between the two states. Under the agreement,
China ceded over 1,942 square kilometers (750 square miles) to Pakistan, and in exchange
Pakistan formally recognized Chinese sovereignty over 5,180 square kilometers (2,000 square
miles) of territory in northern Kashmir and Ladakh. This land transfer facilitated the building of
the Karakoram Highway in 1978, which connects China’s Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region
19 “Chinese Senior Vice Foreign Minister Calls on President,” Embassy of the PRC in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, December 14, 2007,
http://pk.chineseembassy.org/eng/zbgx/t390232.htm.
20 Li Keqiang, “Making New Progress in Growing China-Pakistan All-Weather Friendship” (speech at the Senate of the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan, Islamabad, May 23, 2013), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1043526.shtml.
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