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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This essay discusses the long-term and current relationship between Pakistan and
Afghanistan, the intertwined militancy in the two countries, and the impact of India, the
United States, China, and other regional powers on the Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship.
MAIN ARGUMENT
Afghanistan’s peaceful future depends to a great extent on an auspicious regional
environment, with Pakistan at its core. Conversely, an unstable Afghanistan threatens
Pakistan, complicating the latter’s ability to refurbish its weak state and economy and
suppress dangerous internal militancy. But in the absence of dramatically improved relations
with India, Pakistan is likely to prefer an unstable Afghanistan to a strong Afghanistan
closely aligned with India. Pakistan thus retains an interest in not liquidating its long-term
relationship with the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network, a policy that exacerbates
Afghan instability.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
• Although the outreach to Pakistan by Afghan president Ashraf Ghani has warmed
relations between the two countries, Pakistan’s geostrategic outlook and the limitations
of its selective counterterrorism policies have not resolutely changed.
• Pakistan’s policies toward both militant groups and Afghanistan are determined as much
by incompetence, inertia, and a lack of capacity as by calibrated duplicitous manipulation.
• Crucially, Pakistan’s willingness to accommodate Afghanistan-oriented militant groups
is motivated by a fear of provoking militants to incite violence in Punjab and threaten
the core of the Pakistani state instead of focusing externally. This paralyzing fear persists
despite Pakistan’s desire to defeat the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan.
• China’s increasing activity in Afghanistan might eventually motivate Beijing to put
pressure on Pakistan in a way that it has previously been unwilling to do. Pakistan may
thus face more united international pressure regarding its policies in Afghanistan and
accommodation of militants than ever before.
• Nonetheless, an expectation of radical change in Pakistan’s strategic outlook and behavior
toward militant groups will likely produce disappointment—in Afghanistan, India, and
the United States. Yet all three countries would be wise not to sacrifice whatever limited
collaboration with Pakistan is at times possible for the still-elusive hope of cajoling
Pakistan into a full-scale and lasting counterterrorism partnership.