pakistan’s

development on democratic lines, its firm hold on power nonetheless ensured a modicum of
stability in state institutions.
However, poor governance, continual wrangling with the judiciary, tense relations with the
military, the lack of a coherent economic and fiscal policy, and near neglect of internal security
during the recent PPP government let the country in a state of crisis. The PML-N government also
failed to come up with any plan to combat militancy during its first year in power. It was only ater
the gruesome Taliban attack on a school in Peshawar in December 2013, killing more than 125
students, that the PML-N was awakened by the military from its indolence to commit its political
will and make the fight against terrorism one of its top priorities.
Pressure from the military led the civilian government to announce first the new security
policy and later the national action plan, which called for the establishment of a network of
counterinsurgency task forces as well as close cooperation between all the civilian and military
intelligence agencies. However, these measures, including the coordination between the central
government and provinces to combat terrorism and militancy, have yet to be realized because of
both bureaucratic inertia and turf wars between different agencies and levels of the government.
Since the inception of the national action plan and Operation Zarb-e-Azb in June 2014, the
military is doing its part with the total commitment of its manpower and resources, achieving
spectacular results in FATA and Karachi. At the same time, the military has recently expressed
it frustration that the civilian government is not emphasizing “good governance” as an integral
part of long-term success against terrorism and militancy. 49 There is some evidence, however,
that improved intelligence work by security agencies has helped foil terrorist plots in Karachi,
Islamabad, Peshawar, and Quetta. 50
Nevertheless, intelligence agencies remain suspicious of each other and are oten engaged in
turf battles; civilian authorities and the military establishment are not always on the same page
on issues of security, especially with regard to going ater sectarian outfits with connections to
political parties. Police and paramilitary agencies remain poorly trained and equipped, central
and provincial governments rarely coordinate their security policies and strategies, and the
political government in Islamabad seems to be preoccupied with one political challenge ater
another, leaving little time for policymakers to address security issues on a long-term basis.
There are various indicators that the Pakistani state is indeed moving in the direction of
resolving—or attempting to resolve—the various contradictions that complicated its political
landscape over the past few decades. The consequences of a rising tide of violence, conflict,
and instability have compelled the establishment in Islamabad to prioritize long-term strategic
thinking over short-term tactical maneuvering. While this may not imply a complete break from
past policies, it does suggest a fundamental rethinking of strategies for ensuring domestic and
regional stability. The national action plan, the giving of a free hand to the military in operational
matters, the establishment of military courts, the rangers’ operation in Karachi, and recent
political initiatives to bring the Baluch insurgents to the negotiating table are some of the measures
that are showing positive results. In such a context of a recalibration of major policy decisions,
it is important to once again reconsider the dynamic role of the state in making the necessary
adjustments to a rapidly changing geopolitical context.
30
NBR
49 “Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) Press Release ater the Corps Commanders Meeting in Rawalpindi.” A few days ater the press
release, the chief justice of the Supreme Court, in a speech in Hyderabad, also chastised the government for “bad governance.” Dawn,
November 14, 2015.
50 “Major Terrorism Plots Foiled,” Pakistan Observer, September 6, 2015.
SPECIAL REPORT u FEBRUARY 2016