pakistan’s

with the Gilgit-Baltistan region located in territory presently held by Pakistan. Years later, as the
situation became more serious, India was compelled to take countermeasures.
A few interactions between Chinese and Pakistani leaders are illustrative of the complex role of
the Kashmir issue in the strategic partnership. In October 1991, Chinese president Yang Shangkun
visited Pakistan and held discussions with President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. Speaking at a banquet
he hosted in honor of the Chinese president, Khan referred to Pakistan’s sincere efforts for a
peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute with India. Yang, however, sidestepped any reference
to the Kashmir issue.
In December 1993, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto paid a three-day visit to China. In her
meeting with Chinese premier Li Peng, Bhutto said that Pakistan would oppose Western moves
and pressure against China on the issues of human rights, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Tibet. She also
briefed Premier Li on Pakistan’s proposed stand on the Kashmir issue at the scheduled foreign
secretary–level talks between India and Pakistan. The Chinese media, while trying to steer a
carefully noncontroversial and neutral course, did not mention that Bhutto had sought Chinese
mediation on the Kashmir issue. An indication that such a request had been made was, however,
contained in her statement describing China as an important balancing power that has a regulatory
role to play on the international scene. Li emphasized at the meeting that issues between India and
Pakistan, including the Kashmir dispute, needed to be resolved through patient dialogue between
the two countries. At the end of her visit, Bhutto announced that she had not sought Chinese
mediation on the Kashmir issue.
Later, in February 1994, Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen visited Pakistan and described
China-Pakistan relations as time-tested and “beneficial for the people of both the countries and
for regional peace and stability.” 21 On the Kashmir issue, Qian hoped that “India and Pakistan
would make progress in resolving the Kashmir issue through dialogue.” Qian also met Pakistani
president Farooq Leghari, Senate chairman Wasim Sajjad, and National Assembly speaker Yousuf
Gillani. Xinhua dispatches covering these meetings made no reference to the Kashmir issue. In
contrast, the Pakistani media sought to project that during the visit Qian had joined Pakistan in
expressing concern “at the gross violation of human rights in Indian held Kashmir.” An official
Pakistani statement pointedly asserted that he had described Indian media reports regarding the
implications of troop removal from the Sino-Indian border as “played up” in order to give rise to
apprehensions, and that “China would never let any such situation take place where India could
have the benefit of the relaxation of tension against Pakistan.” At a press conference in Dhaka in
February 1994 while on the second leg of his tour to Bangladesh, Qian responded to questions
on the Kashmir issue and asserted that “China’s position on the issue remains unchanged and
that India and Pakistan could settle the dispute let over by history through peaceful negotiations,
taking into account the UN resolutions and the relevant agreements between the two countries.” 22
China’s proximity to Pakistan and the latter’s influence on its stance on Jammu and Kashmir
(J&K) was evident in China’s open support for Pakistan. China’s position revealed a desire to
overtly interfere in the affairs of J&K and coincided with the tacit agreement between Washington
and Beijing to cooperate in a bid to jointly resolve contentious issues in South Asia, including
Kashmir. Just days prior to Hu Jintao’s summit meeting with U.S. president Barack Obama in
106
NBR
21 This paragraph draws on Xinhua dispatches during February 21–24, 1994. See also Jayadeva Ranade, China Unveiled: Insights into Chinese
Strategic Thinking (New Delhi: KW Publishers, 2013).
22 Qian Qichen (press conference in Dhaka, February 27, 1994).
SPECIAL REPORT u FEBRUARY 2016