pakistan’s

states. This or a similar network could surely be recreated on short notice, even without the same
actors, should the Pakistani deep state wish to do so.
Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and operational doctrine are entirely India-centric. Because
Pakistan does not define a nuclear doctrine in any of its policy papers, the analyses that follow
are derived from statements by officials and political leaders. The country’s nuclear doctrine is
one of “first use.” This means that if seriously threatened, Pakistan would initiate a nuclear strike
against an adversary to avoid a situation of serious loss or impending defeat. For this purpose,
Pakistan defines four possible red lines, the crossing of which by an adversary will lead to a nuclear
response. These red lines, which all focus on India, are said to be:
• Space threshold. India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory.
• Military threshold. India destroys a large part of either Pakistan’s land or air forces.
• Economic threshold. India takes actions to strangle Pakistan economically.
• Political threshold. India pushes Pakistan into a condition of extreme political destabilization or
creates a large-scale internal subversion. 15
As a matter of policy, none of these red lines are defined with any greater clarity and may hence
be determined by the Nuclear Command Authority, depending on prevailing circumstances.
Pakistan’s belief in the possibility of early nuclear warfighting is demonstrated by the fact that
it has recently developed a short-range battlefield nuclear weapon, the Nasr. With a minimum
range of 60 km, this missile can only be used tactically. 16 Given Pakistan’s appreciation of a
sudden attack by Indian forces and, therefore, the possible vulnerability of these weapons when
forward deployed, it is possible that the use of Nasr missiles may be delegated to front-line military
commanders, with all the attendant concerns of unauthorized or premature use. 17
Pakistan continues to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. It has acquired four nuclear
reactors from China and is not prepared to halt fissile material production at this date. This policy
has led Islamabad to oppose even discussions on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty at the Conference
on Disarmament in Geneva. 18 Without this treaty, the world cannot limit further production of
fissile material and begin a process of global reduction of nuclear weapons.
The Dangers of Pakistan’s Nuclear Insecurity
There are many scenarios under which nuclear proliferation by Pakistan could affect global
security. For the purpose of this analysis and for a better appreciation of policy options, three
possible contingencies are considered. 19
15 For a comparison with India’s nuclear doctrine, see Michael Krepon, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Strategy and Deterrence Stability,” Stimson Center,
December 2012, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Krepon_-_Pakistan_Nuclear_Strategy_and_Deterrence_Stability.pdf.
16 For details on Pakistan’s missile arsenal, see NTI, “Country Profiles: Pakistan.”
17 For a discussion of concerns within the Indian strategic community, see Manoj Joshi, “Ballistic Missile Nasr: A Bigger Threat from Pakistan,”
India Today, June 2, 2011, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/pakistans-short-range-ballistic-missile-nasr-is-a-matter-of-concern-forindia/0/140087.html.
18 Peter Crail, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Buildup Vexes FMCT Talks,” Arms Control Today.
19 Jeffrey Goldberg and Marc Ambinder, “Ally from Hell,” Atlantic, October 28, 2011, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/12/
the-ally-from-hell/308730. Graham Allison of the Belfer Center at Harvard University also suggests these three likely contingencies. See
Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2005).
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