pakistan’s

All of Afghanistan’s neighbors, as well as regional actors, would benefit to one degree or
another from a stable Afghanistan, and most of these states would prefer such an outcome. Even
Pakistan, while defining a strong pro-India Afghanistan as the worst possible result, would
prefer a neutral, nonaligned, stable Afghanistan to one torn by outright civil war or destabilized
by extensive militancy. But if Afghanistan’s stabilization remains a distant aspiration, all of the
countries in the region will persist in strengthening their ethnically based proxies and stimulate
each other’s insecurity.
Despite recent tragic and brutal terrorist attacks in Pakistan and declarations by Pakistani
officials that they will now target all militants equally and robustly, there are strong reasons
to doubt that a fundamental reprioritization and redefinition of Pakistan’s basic security and
strategic interests has taken place. At a minimum, such a shit will continue to face large
obstacles from within Pakistan. These countervailing pressures are as much a function of
Pakistan’s fears, incompetence, and inability as they are of its scheming duplicity, regional
power plays, and ambitions.
Given the internal uncertainties in Afghanistan, external actors’ hedging, and Pakistan’s own
internal limitations, poor governance, and fears, as well as the inertia of its strategic outlook,
Pakistan is unlikely to start acting decisively against Afghanistan-oriented militants in its own
territory anytime soon. Nor is it likely to have the capacity to coerce the Afghan Taliban into
serious negotiations with the Afghan government anytime soon. However, Islamabad is likely to
find its existing policies in Afghanistan increasingly costly with respect to external support for
Pakistan, not just from the United States and its NATO allies but also from China. Moreover,
playing divide-and-rule with militant groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan will continue to
augment Pakistan’s own deep-seated internal security and governance challenges.
An expectation of a radical change in Pakistan’s strategic outlook and behavior will likely
produce disappointment—especially in the United States, Afghanistan, and India. But none of
these countries’ policies toward Pakistan need to be on or off, black or white. While Pakistan is
highly unlikely to sever relations with Afghanistan-oriented militants or start resolutely acting
against all terrorist groups, particularly those focused on India, it has the capacity and can be
motivated to engage in some cooperation on matters of counterterrorism in the region and
anti-militancy in Afghanistan. All three countries would be wise not to sacrifice whatever limited
collaboration with Pakistan is at times possible for the still-elusive hope of cajoling Pakistan into a
full-scale and lasting counterterrorism partnership.
140
NBR
SPECIAL REPORT u FEBRUARY 2016