pakistan’s

over the past two decades. It is equally obvious that the path of confrontation with India has
crippled Pakistan in every way and prevented it from becoming a modern, stable, and prosperous
state. Nevertheless, the failure of this approach has not led the army to question the basis of its
confrontational India policy.
As a smaller and weaker state, Pakistan could have adopted a more conciliatory approach
toward India. It has, however, refused to explore the creation of a web of relations to entangle
India to reduce the perceived Indian threat. In this, the Pakistani state and society and polity have
reinforced each other.
The Modi Government’s Policy toward Pakistan
Indian policy toward Pakistan has evolved significantly since Narendra Modi took office in 2014.
Initially, the Modi government set the following expectations for its approach toward Pakistan:
• India-Pakistan dialogue would be in accordance with internationally accepted conventions.
Hence, Pakistan should not interact with separatists before official engagements, which marked
a departure from the past laissez-faire Indian attitude.
• Pakistan’s attempts to internationalize any aspect of bilateral relations, including the Kashmir
issue, would be futile. This expectation sent a clear signal not only to Pakistan but also to the
international community.
• India would respond with force to any violence emanating from Pakistan. The Modi
government’s commitment to this policy was demonstrated by its response to Pakistan firing
on Indian military posts and villages in October 2014.
To engage Pakistan purposefully, in 2015 Modi diluted the red line he had drawn about
meetings of Pakistani representatives and the separatists. He allowed such meetings on the
conclusion of official India-Pakistan meetings. Modi sent the Indian foreign secretary to Pakistan
on an exploratory visit in March. He also took the initiative to meet Prime Minister Sharif in
Ufa, Russia, in July on the sidelines of a multilateral summit. The two decided, inter alia, that the
national security advisers of both countries would meet in New Delhi to discuss terrorism-related
issues. When the Pakistan Army objected to an exclusive meeting on terrorism, Modi again
showed flexibility, and the two national security advisers met in Bangkok in early December. The
foreign secretaries were present at the meeting, and the agenda was broad. The Pakistan national
security adviser assured his Indian counterpart that all Pakistani institutions were determined to
establish good relations with India and meet Indian concerns on terrorism. The Indian foreign
minister visited Islamabad a few days ater the meeting for an Afghanistan-related conference. She
met Pakistan’s entire civilian leadership to discuss bilateral relations. The two countries decided
to embark on a comprehensive bilateral dialogue whose modalities were to be worked out by the
foreign secretaries. On his way back to New Delhi from Kabul on December 25, Modi stopped over
in Lahore for a few hours to meet Sharif. The two reiterated their commitment to take relations
forward. The positive trend in the relationship took a major hit, however, when in early January
2016 terrorists of the Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammed attacked a major Indian Air Force base
at Pathankot in the Punjab state. Modi reacted soberly but firmly and signaled that Pakistan
should take action against the conspirators. India has provided leads to Pakistan, but Pakistan is
prevaricating, and public pressure on Modi to refrain from being sot on Pakistan is strong. These
developments have had a negative impact on the bilateral process.
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