pakistan’s

The majority of judges were also not reluctant to forget their oaths on the constitution and take
new oaths on constitutional ordinances promulgated by the coup-making generals.
General Musharraf dismissed Chief Justice Itikhar Chaudhari in 2007. Breaking with
tradition, Chaudhari took on the army and was supported by a large group of lawyers who took
to the streets. The restoration of the elected government in 2008 saw the return of Chaudhari to
the chief justice’s chair. Since then, the judiciary has been assertive and activist. It has closely
scrutinized the conduct of the government and the army, including in cases of illegal actions by the
intelligence agencies and corruption by political leaders. Though Chaudhari has retired, a series of
cases against Musharraf, including charges of treason and murder, are being heard by the courts.
Whether the judiciary will be able to continue with its present posture is unclear, as
resentment is growing in the army and the political class. If the judiciary succeeds in the face
of such opposition, it will help nudge the country on a path of constitutional democracy and
respect of law.
Pakistan-India Relations
174
NBR
Pakistan’s India Policy
The creation of Pakistan was opposed by Indian political groups in pre-independent and
undivided India that were committed to a united country. Yet once Pakistan became a sovereign
state, except for fringe groups, India accepted the reality of the new country. However, Pakistan
continued to view its neighbor as a threat. This perception has persisted all through its existence
and has had a decisive impact on the evolution of both the state and society. In particular, this
preoccupation is responsible for the dominant role that the Pakistan Army has played in domestic
affairs. While the army’s popularity has fluctuated over time, it has remained the preeminent
institution of the Pakistani state by skillfully building up the Indian threat while casting itself as
the sole protector of the nation.
Pakistan refracts all of its external policies and engagements through the prism of its India
policy, which is based on the premise of India being a permanent threat and therefore by extension
a permanent enemy. This attitude is unlikely to change because it flows from the two-nation
theory, which is the ideological foundation of the Pakistani state. The army perceives itself as
the state’s guardian and is ever wary of constructive engagement with India, as it is fearful that
closer ties would weaken Pakistan’s sovereignty. The core issue between India and Pakistan is
thus ideological; Kashmir is only a by-product of this disagreement, though Pakistan emphasizes
it as the core issue between the two countries. Although segments of Pakistani public opinion
vigorously challenge the view of India as a permanent enemy, in the foreseeable future they are
unlikely to pose a threat to the army’s hold on the country’s national security and vital areas of
foreign policy. Indeed, large sections of the population have internalized the army’s approach,
especially among Islamist groups.
Pakistan’s approach to meet the Indian threat has been to rely on military means, establishing
strong ties with countries inimical to India while utilizing tools of subversion and terror. As a
smaller state, its conventional force levels will remain inferior to India’s. Hence, Pakistan relies
on a nuclear deterrent and uses militant groups to wage a proxy war against India, thereby
keeping India on the defensive and reducing the impact of the natural disparities between the two
countries. The futility of this approach is obvious, however, as India has far outstripped Pakistan
SPECIAL REPORT u FEBRUARY 2016