pakistan’s

More documents

Recommendations

Info

All of Afghanistan’s neighbors, as well as regional actors, would benefit to one degree or another from a stable Afghanistan, and most of these states would prefer such an outcome. Even Pakistan, while defining a strong pro-India Afghanistan as the worst possible result, would prefer a neutral, nonaligned, stable Afghanistan to one torn by outright civil war or destabilized by extensive militancy. But if Afghanistan’s stabilization remains a distant aspiration, all of the countries in the region will persist in strengthening their ethnically based proxies and stimulate each other’s insecurity. Despite recent tragic and brutal terrorist attacks in Pakistan and declarations by Pakistani officials that they will now target all militants equally and robustly, there are strong reasons to doubt that a fundamental reprioritization and redefinition of Pakistan’s basic security and strategic interests has taken place. At a minimum, such a shit will continue to face large obstacles from within Pakistan. These countervailing pressures are as much a function of Pakistan’s fears, incompetence, and inability as they are of its scheming duplicity, regional power plays, and ambitions. Given the internal uncertainties in Afghanistan, external actors’ hedging, and Pakistan’s own internal limitations, poor governance, and fears, as well as the inertia of its strategic outlook, Pakistan is unlikely to start acting decisively against Afghanistan-oriented militants in its own territory anytime soon. Nor is it likely to have the capacity to coerce the Afghan Taliban into serious negotiations with the Afghan government anytime soon. However, Islamabad is likely to find its existing policies in Afghanistan increasingly costly with respect to external support for Pakistan, not just from the United States and its NATO allies but also from China. Moreover, playing divide-and-rule with militant groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan will continue to augment Pakistan’s own deep-seated internal security and governance challenges. An expectation of a radical change in Pakistan’s strategic outlook and behavior will likely produce disappointment—especially in the United States, Afghanistan, and India. But none of these countries’ policies toward Pakistan need to be on or off, black or white. While Pakistan is highly unlikely to sever relations with Afghanistan-oriented militants or start resolutely acting against all terrorist groups, particularly those focused on India, it has the capacity and can be motivated to engage in some cooperation on matters of counterterrorism in the region and anti-militancy in Afghanistan. All three countries would be wise not to sacrifice whatever limited collaboration with Pakistan is at times possible for the still-elusive hope of cajoling Pakistan into a full-scale and lasting counterterrorism partnership. 140 NBR SPECIAL REPORT u FEBRUARY 2016
the national bureau of asian research nbr special report #55 | february 2016 Pakistan and the Threat of Global Jihadism: Implications for Regional Security Husain Haqqani HUSAIN HAQQANI is Director for South and Central Asia at the Hudson Institute. He can be reached at . 141
Page 1 and 2:
the national bureau of asian resear
Page 3 and 4:
nbr special report #55 | february 2
Page 5 and 6:
nbr special report #55 | february 2
Page 7 and 8:
Page 9 and 10:
Yet Pakistan’s instability is not
Page 11 and 12:
prosecute its leaders for war crime
Page 13 and 14:
efforts toward real security—both
Page 15 and 16:
to both U.S. and regional interests
Page 17 and 18:
Page 19 and 20:
Few countries in the developing wor
Page 21 and 22:
provinces from 47.5% to 56.0% in 20
Page 23 and 24:
the local level. Provincial governm
Page 25 and 26:
asking the U.S. government to inter
Page 27 and 28:
to abolish the National Security Co
Page 29 and 30:
parties, the resulting plan gives e
Page 31 and 32:
the novel idea to reserve quotas fo
Page 33 and 34:
many of them in their teens, 38 who
Page 35 and 36:
involvement in violence in Indian-c
Page 37:
The righteous rage articulated by I
Page 40 and 41:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This essay diachr
Page 42 and 43:
While Pakistani elites have time an
Page 44 and 45:
f i g u r e 1 All political violenc
Page 46 and 47:
f i g u r e 3 Communal violence in
Page 48 and 49:
f i g u r e 5 Terrorist violence in
Page 50 and 51:
Figure 1 depicts all political viol
Page 52 and 53:
(Jaish-e-Mohammad, Harkat-ul-Jihadi
Page 54 and 55:
When the Soviet Union withdrew from
Page 56 and 57:
During this same period when Pakist
Page 58 and 59:
groups form the backbone of the TTP
Page 60 and 61:
particularly from the army. The dir
Page 62 and 63:
Not only has Pakistan for the most
Page 64 and 65:
other relevant historical opinions
Page 66 and 67:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This essay argues
Page 68 and 69:
political accountability. The essay
Page 70 and 71:
Residents of the area note that Cha
Page 72 and 73:
modernizing middle-class nationalis
Page 74 and 75:
From Religious Education to Sectari
Page 76 and 77:
During the past few years the mains
Page 78 and 79:
worker did not plan to vote for Imr
Page 80 and 81:
Baluch (backed by the PPP) against
Page 82 and 83:
so oten compete. Teachers and their
Page 85 and 86:
Page 87 and 88:
The trauma of partition in 1947 emb
Page 89 and 90:
the Siachen and Sir Creek disputes.
Page 91 and 92:
t a b l e 1 Bilateral trade between
Page 93 and 94:
Challenges in the Bilateral Relatio
Page 95 and 96: war of liberation in 1971, the Sovi
Page 97 and 98: within India view the November 26 a
Page 99 and 100: that such groups or individuals—t
Page 101 and 102: political and strategic discourse,
Page 103 and 104: project. 74 In November 2014, the s
Page 105 and 106: the national bureau of asian resear
Page 107 and 108: Diplomatic relations between China
Page 109 and 110: in military equipment to Pakistan.
Page 111 and 112: High-Level Diplomacy and Exchanges
Page 113 and 114: September 2009, Chinese vice foreig
Page 115: Islamic countries. Pakistan, Bangla
Page 118 and 119: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This essay examin
Page 120 and 121: military cooperation with Pakistan.
Page 122 and 123: Ironically, the quest for energy se
Page 124 and 125: Iran is equally (if not more) worri
Page 126 and 127: automatically draw in Iran as a par
Page 128 and 129: acceptable than what might emerge i
Page 130 and 131: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This essay discus
Page 132 and 133: problems extend to the military, co
Page 134 and 135: parliament building. 10 During the
Page 136 and 137: and other regional countries. Yet i
Page 138 and 139: ater Ghani’s outreach to Pakistan
Page 140 and 141: latter’s ability to regroup, resu
Page 142 and 143: United States will succeed in stabi
Page 144 and 145: But like many other diplomatic even
Page 148 and 149: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This essay traces
Page 150 and 151: foreign funding, and policy choices
Page 152 and 153: South Asia Terrorism Portal, in Pak
Page 154 and 155: people with an unstable polity, num
Page 156 and 157: In recent years, however, there has
Page 158 and 159: dangerous repercussions for Pakista
Page 161 and 162: the national bureau of asian resear
Page 163 and 164: In an interview in 2006, Robert Gal
Page 165 and 166: states. This or a similar network c
Page 167 and 168: Intelligence (ISI) over the last th
Page 169 and 170: would be its impact on the Iranian
Page 171 and 172: The volatile security environment i
Page 173: the national bureau of asian resear
Page 176 and 177: Civil Society Pakistan’s civil so
Page 178 and 179: Civil-Military Relations The Pakist
Page 180 and 181: The majority of judges were also no
Page 182 and 183: What is not in doubt, however, is t
Page 184: Outlook Pakistan is a deeply troubl
show all

pakistan’s

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?