pakistan’s

worker did not plan to vote for Imran Khan. Instead, he planned to vote for Khan’s PML-N
challenger, Sardar Ayaz Sadiq. And he did so owing to the political leanings of his biraderi (i.e., his
kinship-based clan). “This system is very strong in Pakistan,” he said, referring to the traditional
power of kinship-based alliances typically associated with rural areas. Even in 2013, the office
worker still insisted that this system must be “respected.” 39 Khan may have won the second-largest
number of votes in Pakistan’s urban areas. But in the end he was unable to secure the seat he
contested in the center of Lahore owing to the power of long-standing rural political patterns.
In the district of Gujrat, this dilemma was very much in play throughout 2013, and the informal
capture of rural and urban land continued to figure prominently. As the campaign season
accelerated, small and medium-sized landowners based near the district headquarters were racked
with anxiety. Although they expected the PML-N to win on a provincial level, they were reluctant
to launch a local challenge to the enduring patronage power of those previously associated with
the “king’s party” of General Musharraf (i.e., the Pakistan Muslim League Quaid-e-Azam, or
PML-Q), namely Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain and Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi. If they expected
to retain any local political influence at all, these landowners knew they would need to provide
their clients with assistance in the context of the district kachehri (where the politics of impunity
were crucial). The question was through whom, in party terms, this informal assistance would be
provided at a local level.
The personal preferences of these anxious local powerbrokers were divided between a National
Assembly candidate holding a PML-N ticket and a Provincial Assembly candidate holding a PTI
ticket. 40 But, middle-class aspirations and personal preferences notwithstanding, they hesitated
to sponsor a rally for anyone other than the Chaudhrys (PML-Q). Even if they could afford to
host separate rallies for separate candidates (which these local powerbrokers could not), would
they be punished by the Chaudhrys for doing so? As in Lahore, the power of patronage rooted
in local notables continued to matter a great deal, and in the end these powerbrokers hosted a
rally for the Chaudhrys. One local powerbroker with ties to the Chaudhrys noted that “people
vote for us because they perceive us as [being able to] come to their help in times of trouble.”
Indeed, during an interview with Pakistan’s Herald, he simultaneously addressed “three different
complaints—one related to illegal occupation of land, another related to gas supply…and a third
regarding the admission of young boys and girls in a local college.” 41 Qabza (illegal land seizures)
and colleges are in many ways the core themes in the patronage politics of Pakistan. Karachi is
one place where these two themes are clearly developed side by side.
Informal Politics: The Case of Karachi
Within Karachi, the more established and well-educated Urdu-speaking Muhajirs have
been challenged, since the 1960s, by the rural-to-urban migration of many Pashtuns, with
both groups seeking to control the city’s vast informal settlements. Since 2001, however, the
influx of Pashtuns has accelerated (with many fleeing the violence tied to militant and military
operations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). And, as this influx has increased, Pashtun control over
39 Jon Boone, “Pakistan Backs Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif as Imran Khan Falls Short,” Observer, May 11, 2013, http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2013/may/12/pakistan-elects-nawaz-sharif-imran.
40 Author interviews conducted in March 2013.
72
NBR
41 Farooq, “In the ‘Right’ Direction.”
SPECIAL REPORT u FEBRUARY 2016