pakistan’s

September 2009, Chinese vice foreign minister He Zhengyue publicized China’s willingness to
mediate between India and Pakistan if required. The offer was repeated twice ater the summit.
Soon thereater, secessionist Hurriyat leader Mirwaiz Umar Farooq asserted that China has a role
to play in settling the Kashmir issue. He also disclosed that he had received an invitation from a
Chinese NGO and would soon be traveling to China. 23
On the whole, however, since 2007, Beijing has taken a far more aggressive stance in siding with
Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute, while asserting its own claims to portions of Indian-controlled
J&K (in particular, the Ladakh region). In 2010, China expanded its claim and designated the
entire state of J&K as disputed by declining a visa to India’s Northern Army commander and
thereater issuing stapled visas to residents of J&K, which India refuses to recognize. China’s
claims on Ladakh are based on the assertion that its people and culture are identical to those
of Tibet. In May 2013, for example, the Zhongguo Qingnian Bao (China Youth Daily) published
an article explicitly highlighting China’s claim to Ladakh. 24 Beijing continues to exert pressure
on international organizations, such as the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank, to
accept its claims, which has resulted in these organizations ceasing to give financial assistance
to development projects in the disputed Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh or to even specifically
mention Arunachal Pradesh or J&K in their reports.
There have been persistent reports since 2010 of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) personnel in
these disputed areas. While some sources claimed that up to 10,000 PLA troops were present, in 2011
the Indian Army’s chief of staff, General V.K. Singh, referred to the presence of nearly 3,500 PLA
personnel in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. India’s Northern Army commander, Lieutenant General
K.T. Parnaik, also warned in 2011 that “the Chinese presence in Gilgit-Baltistan and the Northern
Areas is increasing steadily. China is involved in the construction and upgrading of numerous
roads, bridges, and hydropower projects.” He added that “Chinese links with Pakistan, through
PoK [Pakistan-occupied Kashmir], lend strength to the China-Pakistan nexus, which has been
of great security concern for us.” 25 In fact, Hong Kong-based, Chinese-controlled media reports
revealed that China’s leadership was considering the possibility of a future deployment of special
forces in these areas to safeguard Chinese assets. 26
Some official Chinese media reports have questioned whether Chinese strategic investments in
Pakistan’s northern areas, and in fact in Pakistan itself, are safe. They point to the newly upgraded
Karakoram Highway, plans for a railway line running along a similar axis down to Gwadar port,
and plans for an oil pipeline from Gwadar to Xinjiang. Since 2009–10, China has been engaged
in almost 35 projects in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir and Pakistan’s northern areas, including
hydroelectric projects and the construction of roads and helipads. PLA engineers are known to be
involved in some of the projects. 27
23 “Visa Rider on Mirwaiz’s China Visit,” Times of India, November 21, 2009, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Visa-rider-on-
Mirwaizs-China-visit/articleshow/5253760.cms; and Ranade, China Unveiled, 168.
24 “Zhong-Yin bianjing zhangpeng duizhi shijian de zhuduo jingshi” [The China-India Border Camp Confrontation Incident: A Good Deal of
Warning], Zhongguo Qingnian Bao, May 10, 2013, http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2013-05/10/nw.D110000zgqnb_20130510_1-10.htm.
25 “4,000 Chinese, Including PLA Men, in PoK: Army Chief,” Times of India, October 6, 2011.
26 For further discussion, see Ranade, China Unveiled, 170.
27 Ranade, “The Future of China-Pakistan Relations.”
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