pakistan’s

China
China has been the bulwark of Pakistan’s security and is its most significant international
partner. As Jayadeva Ranade examines in his essay, China provided significant assistance in
the development of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and is its largest supplier of military
equipment. 8 The foundation of the partnership is based on common negativity toward India.
While Sino-Indian ties have become multifaceted over the past few decades, old problems remain;
hence, the cement of the Sino-Pakistani relationship should hold for the foreseeable future.
The threat of Uighur jihadism is growing in China and is no longer confined to Xinjiang. There
is a sizeable reservoir of sympathy and support for the Uighurs among Pakistani jihadi groups.
Although Pakistan has attempted to combat these tendencies, this is one area where China will
expect Pakistan to act with even greater vigor.
Alongside security ties, China’s economic engagement with Pakistan will continue to grow,
especially as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor between Xinjiang and Gwadar port develops.
China has committed $46 billion for the project, of which more than $30 billion will be spent
on power projects in Pakistan. 9 The project was the centerpiece of Chinese president Xi Jinping’s
visit to Pakistan in April 2015. Apart from their economic impact, these investments will create
a positive vested interest for China in Pakistan apart from the two countries’ common antipathy
toward India. China’s involvement in infrastructure development, including in the energy sector,
will only increase in the years ahead.
Iran
Pakistan-Iran relations have been tense since the shah was overthrown in 1979. Mutual
suspicions over the sectarian attitudes of Pakistan’s state institutions, the nuclear question,
differing approaches toward Afghanistan, and Pakistan’s relationships with Saudi Arabia and the
United States have contributed to uneven ties. Although it is unlikely that relations will break
down completely, strains below the surface will continue. The strength of Pakistan’s relations with
Saudi Arabia will have a major impact on Pakistan-Iran relations. While there is little doubt that
Pakistan’s strong bonds with Saudi Arabia will endure, Islamabad will not directly get involved in
the Saudi-Iran tensions or conflict unless the security of Saudi Arabia is under imminent threat.
This was demonstrated in April 2015 when Pakistan denied Saudi Arabia’s appeal for military
assistance in its Yemen campaign.
As Tariq A. Karim argues in his essay, heightened energy cooperation offers Pakistan and Iran
a unique opportunity to rebuild their relationship. Pakistan has considerable energy interests
in Iran, especially in the country’s vast gas reserves. With the liting of U.S. sanctions following
the Iran nuclear deal, the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline will become a serious possibility, which, if
realized, would facilitate increased energy trade.
8 T.V. Paul, “The Causes and Consequences of China-Pakistani Nuclear/Missile Collaboration,” in South Asia’s Nuclear Security Dilemma:
India, Pakistan, and China, ed. Lowell Dittmer (New York: Routledge, 2005), 181–82. For further insight into Chinese arms supplies to
Pakistan, see Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, http://www.sipri.org/databases/
armstransfers.
9 Katharine Houreld, “China and Pakistan Launch Economic Corridor Plan Worth $46 Billion,” Reuters, April 20, 2015, http://www.reuters.
com/article/2015/04/20/us-pakistan-china-idUSKBN0NA12T20150420.
PAKISTAN’S COMPLEX SECURITY DYNAMICS u KATJU
177