pakistan’s

ater Ghani’s outreach to Pakistan, it is not likely that Islamabad will liquidate all of these assets to
please Kabul.
These political and security uncertainties already have had a pronounced effect on Afghanistan’s
fragile economy. Domestic economic performance in 2013 and 2014 was even worse than expected,
with massive economic shrinkage, large unemployment, capital flight, and a chronic as well as
acute fiscal crisis. In addition to the post-2014 uncertainties and the fact that much of Afghanistan’s
legal economic growth has been tied to the presence of foreign security forces now leaving the
country, the inability of the Afghan government to improve tax and customs collection and reduce
massive corruption has caused a significant shrinkage in GDP growth. From double digits earlier
in the decade, GPD growth plummeted to almost zero in spring 2015. 19 Indeed, revenue thet in
2014 turned out to be the worst since 2001. The promise of the country’s mineral wealth producing
revenues to wean Afghanistan off dependence on foreign aid and illegal opium production for
income generation, economic growth, and human development remains just a promise.
Pakistan’s Policies toward Afghanistan
Political instability and the accompanying economic crisis will deeply affect the performance,
loyalties, and sustainability of Afghan security forces. They also deeply affect the expectation of
stability and relative effectiveness of power arrangements in Afghanistan that Pakistan uses to
evaluate its policies toward the country. An unstable Afghanistan hosting anti-Pakistan militant
groups is deeply threatening. But in the absence of dramatically improved and normalized
relations with India, Pakistan still likely prefers this scenario to one in which a strong Afghanistan
is closely aligned with India.
In the context of unresolved difficulties in its relations with India and great uncertainty in
Afghanistan, Pakistan chooses to continue cultivating Afghan Pashtun militants. Clearly the
Pakistani government (or at least parts of it) has been coddling the Afghan Taliban and the
Haqqani network for years. The ISI’s relationship with the latter has been particularly tight.
More than merely allowing the groups to enjoy safe havens in FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,
Baluchistan, and Karachi, as well as fundraising in Pakistan, the ISI has also provided logistical
support, armaments, and technical and logistical advice to the insurgents. At the same time, the
ISI has actively sought to exploit the provision of these resources and safe havens to the militant
groups to influence their strategic decision-making and tactical operations. ISI observers have
participated in meetings of the Quetta Shura and used coercion, such as selectively arresting and
releasing key Afghan militant leaders and de facto holding hostage their families in Pakistan, to
manipulate decisions regarding military operations in Afghanistan or negotiations with Kabul or
Washington. 20 Interrogations of Taliban and Haqqani militants have revealed that in meetings
with the insurgents, ISI officers are regularly hostile to the United States, ISAF, and the Afghan
government. They call for continued jihad and for expelling “foreign invaders” from Afghanistan,
a message that strongly resonates with Taliban members. 21
However, the relationship between the ISI and Afghan militants is also fraught with tensions.
Much of the Taliban, particularly in southern Afghanistan, resents the degree of influence and
132
NBR
19 Author’s interviews with World Bank and International Monetary Fund officials in Afghanistan, September and October 2014, and in
Washington, D.C., November 2014. See also “Afghan Traders Protest Taxes; 10 Die as Bombs Target Police,” Associated Press, April 6, 2015.
20 Matt Waldman, “The Sun in the Sky: The Relationship between Pakistan’s ISI and Afghan Insurgents,” Discussion Paper, no. 18, Crisis States
Research Center, June 2010, www.aljazeera.com/mritems/Documents/2010/6/13/20106138531279734lse-isi-taliban.pdf.
21 “State of the Taliban,” 8.
SPECIAL REPORT u FEBRUARY 2016