pakistan’s

More documents

Recommendations

Info

problems extend to the military, could set off one of the most dangerous security threats in Asia and the world. Ater all, Pakistan is a large, nuclear-armed Muslim country that coexists in only a precarious peace with its neighbor India. Yet while a U.S. disengagement from direct fighting in Afghanistan could allow the United States to rebalance its relationship with Pakistan and shit the center of U.S.-Pakistan relations beyond the narrow prism of counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan, an unstable Afghanistan will also ultimately be very unhealthy for Pakistan. This essay proceeds as follows: It first discusses the long-term relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan and explores how the India factor influences relations. Next, the essay discusses militancy in both Afghanistan and Pakistan and the latter’s policy responses, including its support for the Afghan Taliban and affiliated groups. This section also explores how Afghanistan’s current security and political developments influence Pakistan’s policy in Afghanistan. The subsequent section considers the U.S. dimension of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations and explores this triangle with respect to militancy in both countries, as well as counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts and negotiations with the Afghan Taliban. The final section analyzes the impact of other regional actors on Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, and China. In particular, it examines the implications for Pakistan of China’s increasingly active and more multifaceted role in Afghanistan. The History of Fear and Rivalry between Pakistan and Afghanistan For decades, relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have been characterized by mutual suspicion and deep-seated animosities, resulting at various times in antagonistic regional security alignments, clandestine plays and counter-plays, cultivation of each other’s rivals, and even low-level overt military exchanges. Among the most difficult issues, discussed in the subsections below, are an unsettled border, ethnic politics and irredentism, and strategic fears and rivalries between the two countries with the specter of India looming over them. An Unsettled Border and Pashtun Irredentism Pakistan and Afghanistan share a long, rugged, and porous border—the Durand Line—which Afghanistan has refused to recognize and which inhabitants on both sides cross with ease and regularity. 3 Pakistan and Afghanistan also share a population of ethnic Pashtuns that Kabul has at times sought to mobilize as a tool against Pakistan. Kabul has also periodically resorted to deriving domestic political capital from Pashtun irredentism and claims of “greater Afghanistan.” 4 In turn, Islamabad has attempted to manipulate Afghan refugees in Pakistan against Kabul by sending them back to an uncertain fate in Afghanistan and overwhelming Afghan authorities with political and economic pressure. 5 At the same time, Afghan refugees in Pakistan, as well as Afghan militants hiding there, no longer remain merely in the border areas but also reside and 126 NBR 3 For seminal work on the Durand Line, see Louis Dupree, “The Durand Line of 1893: A Case Study in Artificial Political Boundaries and Culture Areas,” in Current Problems in Afghanistan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 77–93. For an analysis of how the border, which is not recognized by Afghanistan, undermines the possibility of improved relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, see Barnett R. Rubin and Abubakar Siddique, “Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate,” United States Institute of Peace, Special Report, no. 176, October 2006, http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SRoct06.pdf. 4 Marvin Weinbaum and Haseeb Humayoon, “The Intertwined Destinies of Afghanistan and Pakistan,” in The Future of Afghanistan, ed. J. Alexander Thier (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2009), 93–103. 5 For a recent such episode, see Kevin Sieff, “Afghan Refugees Forced to Return Home,” Washington Post, June 20, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/afghan-refugees-forced-to-return-home/2012/06/20/gJQAQEbRrV_story.html. SPECIAL REPORT u FEBRUARY 2016
operate in other parts of Pakistan, including such core areas as Karachi, where they influence the country’s politics, economics, militancy, crime, and ethnic relations. Since the British colonial era, Pakistani Pashtuns have been a troubled people, isolated from and neglected by the rest of Pakistan. Even today, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the home of many Pashtuns, are stuck in an inherited colonial design: appointed political agents rule over the territories and the Pashtun people via tribal maliks (tribal elders), a draconian Frontier Crime Regulation system collectively punishes entire tribes for transgressions, and the areas lack accountable political representation in Islamabad. Under former president Asif Ali Zardari, the government of Pakistan eliminated some of the harshest elements of the Frontier Crime Regulation code and permitted the formation of and campaigning by political parties in FATA. But the systematic reforms required to equalize the status of FATA with the rest of Pakistan have not been undertaken. 6 The tribal areas continue to be economically and socially underdeveloped, lack basic legal and human rights, and hence are politically restless and a fertile ground for terrorist groups. 7 Thus, the possibility of Pakistani Pashtun separatism, perhaps fanned by Afghanistan for domestic political reasons or as leverage against Pakistan, remains a worry for the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment. The India Specter The dominant lens through which Pakistan’s military-intelligence establishment, however, continues to see Afghanistan is through Pakistan’s long-standing existential rivalry with India. Since 1947, when Britain granted both states independence, Pakistan has fought four wars with India: three over the status of Kashmir and the so-called Line of Control that separates the Pakistani part of Kashmir from India’s, and one over the transformation of East Pakistan into the independent state of Bangladesh. More than a decade ater September 11, Pakistan’s military-intelligence establishment remains preoccupied with India’s ascendance at a time of Pakistan’s own stagnation and atrophy. 8 Pakistan thus continues to be deeply suspicious of India’s ambitions in Afghanistan, which has repeatedly been a prime theater for Indian and Pakistani rivalries. As early as the 1950s, India offered itself to Afghanistan as a counterbalance to Pakistan via military and economic assistance and major cultural exchanges. Many Afghan elites have been educated in India and lived there in exile. 9 During the 1980s, while Pakistan and the United States supported the mujahideen in Afghanistan, India backed the pro-Soviet regime of President Mohammad Najibullah. During the 1990s, when Pakistan supported the mostly Pashtun Taliban, India (along with Russia, China, and Iran) provided assistance to the Northern Alliance mostly representing non-Pashtun minorities. Since 2001, India has pledged approximately $2 billion toward Afghanistan’s reconstruction, including infrastructure, hospitals, and other highly visible projects, such as a new Afghan 6 For details of the 2011 FATA reforms, see Shehryar Fazli, “A New Dawn for Pakistan’s Tribal Areas?” Foreign Policy, August 12, 2011, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/08/12/a_new_dawn_for_pakistans_tribal_areas. 7 See International Crisis Group, “Countering Militancy in FATA,” Asia Report, no. 178, October 21, 2009; and Joshua White, “Pakistan’s Islamist Frontier: Islamic Politics and U.S. Policy in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier,” in The Afghanistan-Pakistan Theater: Militant Islam, Security, and Stability, ed. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Clifford D. May (Washington, D.C.: Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 2010), 41–74. 8 For more on Pakistan’s India preoccupation, see Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan; and Lieven, Pakistan: A Hard Country. 9 Of course, many Afghan elites have also been educated in Pakistan. PAKISTAN’S RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN u FELBAB-BROWN 127
Page 1 and 2:
the national bureau of asian resear
Page 3 and 4:
nbr special report #55 | february 2
Page 5 and 6:
nbr special report #55 | february 2
Page 7 and 8:
Page 9 and 10:
Yet Pakistan’s instability is not
Page 11 and 12:
prosecute its leaders for war crime
Page 13 and 14:
efforts toward real security—both
Page 15 and 16:
to both U.S. and regional interests
Page 17 and 18:
Page 19 and 20:
Few countries in the developing wor
Page 21 and 22:
provinces from 47.5% to 56.0% in 20
Page 23 and 24:
the local level. Provincial governm
Page 25 and 26:
asking the U.S. government to inter
Page 27 and 28:
to abolish the National Security Co
Page 29 and 30:
parties, the resulting plan gives e
Page 31 and 32:
the novel idea to reserve quotas fo
Page 33 and 34:
many of them in their teens, 38 who
Page 35 and 36:
involvement in violence in Indian-c
Page 37:
The righteous rage articulated by I
Page 40 and 41:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This essay diachr
Page 42 and 43:
While Pakistani elites have time an
Page 44 and 45:
f i g u r e 1 All political violenc
Page 46 and 47:
f i g u r e 3 Communal violence in
Page 48 and 49:
f i g u r e 5 Terrorist violence in
Page 50 and 51:
Figure 1 depicts all political viol
Page 52 and 53:
(Jaish-e-Mohammad, Harkat-ul-Jihadi
Page 54 and 55:
When the Soviet Union withdrew from
Page 56 and 57:
During this same period when Pakist
Page 58 and 59:
groups form the backbone of the TTP
Page 60 and 61:
particularly from the army. The dir
Page 62 and 63:
Not only has Pakistan for the most
Page 64 and 65:
other relevant historical opinions
Page 66 and 67:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This essay argues
Page 68 and 69:
political accountability. The essay
Page 70 and 71:
Residents of the area note that Cha
Page 72 and 73:
modernizing middle-class nationalis
Page 74 and 75:
From Religious Education to Sectari
Page 76 and 77:
During the past few years the mains
Page 78 and 79:
worker did not plan to vote for Imr
Page 80 and 81:
Baluch (backed by the PPP) against
Page 82 and 83: so oten compete. Teachers and their
Page 85 and 86: the national bureau of asian resear
Page 87 and 88: The trauma of partition in 1947 emb
Page 89 and 90: the Siachen and Sir Creek disputes.
Page 91 and 92: t a b l e 1 Bilateral trade between
Page 93 and 94: Challenges in the Bilateral Relatio
Page 95 and 96: war of liberation in 1971, the Sovi
Page 97 and 98: within India view the November 26 a
Page 99 and 100: that such groups or individuals—t
Page 101 and 102: political and strategic discourse,
Page 103 and 104: project. 74 In November 2014, the s
Page 107 and 108: Diplomatic relations between China
Page 109 and 110: in military equipment to Pakistan.
Page 111 and 112: High-Level Diplomacy and Exchanges
Page 113 and 114: September 2009, Chinese vice foreig
Page 115: Islamic countries. Pakistan, Bangla
Page 118 and 119: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This essay examin
Page 120 and 121: military cooperation with Pakistan.
Page 122 and 123: Ironically, the quest for energy se
Page 124 and 125: Iran is equally (if not more) worri
Page 126 and 127: automatically draw in Iran as a par
Page 128 and 129: acceptable than what might emerge i
Page 130 and 131: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This essay discus
Page 134 and 135: parliament building. 10 During the
Page 136 and 137: and other regional countries. Yet i
Page 138 and 139: ater Ghani’s outreach to Pakistan
Page 140 and 141: latter’s ability to regroup, resu
Page 142 and 143: United States will succeed in stabi
Page 144 and 145: But like many other diplomatic even
Page 146 and 147: All of Afghanistan’s neighbors, a
Page 148 and 149: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This essay traces
Page 150 and 151: foreign funding, and policy choices
Page 152 and 153: South Asia Terrorism Portal, in Pak
Page 154 and 155: people with an unstable polity, num
Page 156 and 157: In recent years, however, there has
Page 158 and 159: dangerous repercussions for Pakista
Page 163 and 164: In an interview in 2006, Robert Gal
Page 165 and 166: states. This or a similar network c
Page 167 and 168: Intelligence (ISI) over the last th
Page 169 and 170: would be its impact on the Iranian
Page 171 and 172: The volatile security environment i
Page 173: the national bureau of asian resear
Page 176 and 177: Civil Society Pakistan’s civil so
Page 178 and 179: Civil-Military Relations The Pakist
Page 180 and 181: The majority of judges were also no
Page 182 and 183:
What is not in doubt, however, is t
Page 184:
Outlook Pakistan is a deeply troubl
show all

pakistan’s

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?