pakistan’s

Ironically, the quest for energy security also created the prospects for both Iran and Pakistan
to act as partners with (or rivals to) each other in serving as conduits for trade and transit to
Central Asia. Iran perceives itself as the natural transit route for oil and gas exports and non-oil
trade from Central Asian countries to world markets. Iran offered India a viable transit route
for trade with the newly independent Central Asian republics by linking major seaports in the
Caspian Sea and the Indian Ocean bordering India with the rest of the world. To this end, the two
countries inked an MOU in 1984, with Tajikistan as the third signatory party, to facilitate India’s
transit trade with the Central Asian republics. India had been participating in efforts to complete
railway projects that would facilitate such transit within Iran. Iran, India, Turkmenistan, and
Kyrgyzstan are also co-signatories of a cargo transit arrangement via rail from Bandar Abbas
to Central Asia and beyond. However, Pakistan, because of its proximity to the region, viewed
all these developments as inimical to its own interests. Instead, it touted a policy of “strategic
depth,” under which Pakistan sought to use the natural advantage of its proximity to the Central
Asian landmass to monopolize access to the region. In effect, these two separate efforts served to
neutralize each other, serving no country’s interest in any considerable measure.
Strategic Cooperation between Iran and India
Iranian strategic calculations have also been a source of tension between Pakistan and Iran, as
the latter looked to bolster its interests by seeking partners with other regional powers, including
Russia and India. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the Central
Asian states—all of which had varying degrees of closeness historically and culturally with
Iran—as comforting buffers, Iran’s traditional relationship of mutual suspicion and hostility with
the former Soviet Union was transformed into a new relationship of potential cooperation and
selective collaboration in defense purchases with the new Russian Federation. In the mid-1990s,
Iran acquired three submarines from Russia and other conventional weaponry from both Russia
and other states of the former Soviet Union. 4
However, with the growing U.S.-Russia detente, Iran viewed Russia as increasingly under U.S.
pressure and therefore not entirely reliable as a source for spare parts and ater-sales services.
(This perception translated into Iran forging and strengthening close ties with both China and
North Korea—but the limited scope of this essay precludes elaboration of this here). Although
Russia completed delivery of all submarines in the mid-1990s, it was around this time that Iran
looked eastward to India as a possible strategic partner in the realm of defense. As such, several
high-level visits between defense personnel were exchanged, albeit without any fanfare. India
could provide Iran spare parts, maintenance, and training in the use of its defense hardware of
Russian or former Soviet origin. Therefore, the two countries cautiously explored the new potential
for expanding strategic cooperation, although neither side talked about this publicly. This caused
considerable angst and discomfort in Pakistan. However, U.S. pressure and the threat of sanctions
on Indo-Iranian deals effectively served to push this issue to the back burner, which militated
against Iran and India coming closer together but also in the process caused vicarious pleasure in
Pakistan and fueled resentment in Iran.
116
NBR
4 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Iran Submarine Capabilities,” July 17, 2013, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/iran-submarine-capabilities;
and Lionel Beehner, “Russia-Iran Arms Trade,” Council on Foreign Relations, Backgrounder, November 1, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/armsindustries-and-trade/russia-iran-arms-trade/p11869.
SPECIAL REPORT u FEBRUARY 2016