pakistan’s

In recent years, however, there has been a rise in Uighur militants trained in Pakistan’s tribal areas
who have returned to Xinjiang. This reflects either Pakistan’s inability or unwillingness to control
its own borders.
This ineffective border control has coincided with a steady rise in kidnappings and killings of
Chinese workers in Pakistan, which threatens important infrastructural projects that are critical
for Pakistan’s own development. While relations between the two countries are still friendly,
Pakistan’s inability to control what happens within its own territory, especially with respect to
groups targeting China, has resulted in a slow decline in Chinese support. In the economic arena,
proposed regional cooperation projects, such as the maritime Silk Road, now seem to bypass
Pakistan because of Chinese fears that continued instability in Pakistan could make the country
unviable as an economic partner. 18
For China, Pakistan is becoming a low-cost secondary deterrent vis-à-vis India, similar to
North Korea vis-à-vis South Korea and Japan. While continuing to maintain close ties and offer
economic and military aid, China rarely goes out of its way to help Pakistan in any conflict with
India. Pakistan’s growing internal problems raise the question of whether China might at some
point see benefits from allying with India on certain issues, while still keeping Pakistan as a
secondary deterrent. Will Beijing apply more pressure on Islamabad to clamp down on the jihadi
groups operating within Pakistan and Afghanistan? Will China use its close ties with Pakistan
to steer the country toward adopting a more stringent policy against all militant groups and
abandoning the perception of some groups as assets?
Conclusions
Pakistan’s national identity is built on Islam. Pakistani leaders may not share the views of jihadi
hardliners about imposing sharia (Islamic law), but they cannot be seen as suppressing Islam in
an Islamic country. This dilemma serves as an advantage for Islamists of all varieties, including
the jihadis. To complicate matters further, the Pakistani deep state (comprising the country’s
military and intelligence services) has used jihadism for leverage in both domestic and foreign
policies. At home, the Islamists have served as a check on the influence of secularists who might
draw the country closer to India, while in Afghanistan and Kashmir they have assisted Pakistan in
exercising power through asymmetrical warfare.
Pakistan is currently engaged in an internal struggle for its soul. To rid the nation of
jihadis, it must consider the plausibility of a national identity other than one based on Islam.
An overwhelming majority of Pakistanis are Muslims, and they practice their faith in varying
degrees of piety. But if the state continues to insist on describing its history solely in religious
terms, denying the pre-Islamic culture of various ethnic groups and a shared history with
neighboring states, Pakistan’s national ideology will continue to advance the goals of radical
Islamists. Notwithstanding the government’s stated policies, Pakistan’s milieu would continue to
be conducive as a haven for global jihadism.
150
NBR
18 Shannon Tezzi, “China’s ‘New Silk Road’ Vision Revealed,” Diplomat, May 9, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/chinas-new-silk-roadvision-revealed/.
SPECIAL REPORT u FEBRUARY 2016