Digitalisation of the economy and its impact on labour markets —

Christophe Degryse
2.2.5 Inequality <strong>and</strong> wage stagnation?
Is technology a factor <strong>of</strong> wage stagnation? While this is a burning question for
<strong>the</strong> world <strong>of</strong> labour, opinions on <strong>the</strong> matter diverge. As noted by, among o<strong>the</strong>rs,
The Open Society Foundation (2015: 3), <strong>the</strong> new technologies ‘hollow out’ <strong>the</strong>
low-skilled jobs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> middle classes so that we may well see an increased
polarisation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> labour market with an increase, on <strong>the</strong> one h<strong>and</strong>, <strong>of</strong> very
low-skilled <strong>and</strong> ill-paid jobs <strong>and</strong>, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r, very highly paid top-level jobs.
One <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> main aspects <strong>of</strong> this polarisation is <strong>the</strong> hollowing out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> middle
class that can be observed in <strong>the</strong> United States. The Pew Research Center
published, in December 2015, a study from which it emerges that <strong>the</strong> income
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> middle classes has been falling over <strong>the</strong> last forty years: ‘Since 1971, each
decade has ended with a smaller share <strong>of</strong> adults living in middle-income
households than at <strong>the</strong> beginning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> decade, <strong>and</strong> no single decade st<strong>and</strong>s
out as having triggered or hastened <strong>the</strong> decline in <strong>the</strong> middle’ (Pew Research
Centre 2015).
Figure 3 Share <strong>of</strong> adults living in middle-income households in <strong>the</strong> United States (%)
2015
20
9
50
12
9
2011
20
9
51
12
8
2001
18
9
54
11
7
1991
18
9
56
12
5
1981
17
9
59
12
3
1971
16
9
61
10
4
Lowest Lower middle Middle Upper middle Highest
Source: Pew Research Center analysis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Current Population Survey, Annual Social <strong>and</strong> Economic Supplements
This evolution could not, <strong>of</strong> course, be attributable solely to <strong>the</strong> information
<strong>and</strong> communications technologies; it is clear that o<strong>the</strong>r factors, notably
demographic, have to be taken into account. But it is none<strong>the</strong>less striking to
observe <strong>the</strong> parallelism between this long-term evolution <strong>and</strong> a form <strong>of</strong>
precarisation <strong>of</strong> employment among <strong>the</strong> middle classes.
A similar trend is also described by Robert Reich (2015): ‘The so-called “share
<strong>economy</strong>” includes independent contractors, temporary workers, <strong>the</strong> selfemployed,
part-timers, freelancers, <strong>and</strong> free agents’, a situation which, on <strong>the</strong>
United States labour market, plunges increasing numbers <strong>of</strong> workers into
precarity. ‘A downturn in dem<strong>and</strong>, or sudden change in consumer needs, or a
personal injury or sickness, can make it impossible to pay <strong>the</strong> bills. It eliminates
42 WP 2016.02