Abdal Hakim Murad - The Cambridge Companion to Islamic Theology

128 Nader El-Bizri
the ash‘arite position
Unlike the H _
anbalite view, the distinctive position of al-Ash‘arı is
best expressed by way of his support of kalam methods in elucidating
the essence–attributes question. After all, he disapproved of unreflective
deference to doctrinal dogmas by way of mimetic assent (taqlıd), given
his firm belief that Muslims have the duty to reason about what it
means to know God, since knowing God amounts to knowing the truth
(al-h _
aqq). 15
In response to the Mu‘tazilite reductive overemphasis on transcendence,
Ash‘arı argued that God’s words about God, as manifested in
the Qur’an, set up the directives by virtue of which reasoned judgements
about the essence–attributes question are to be measured. The affirmation
of God’s attributes should be coupled with the negation of implied
anthropomorphic determinations. Analogy is problematic when it hints
at any form of similitude between God and anything in His world of
creation. Authentically to believe that ‘‘nothing is like Him’’ (42:11)
obligates a refutation of tashbıh and tamthıl. If the attributes are
examined through a radically literal reading, heretical innovation may
ensue, as exemplified in the unsustainable doctrines of anthropomorphists
(mushabbiha) and corporealists (mujassima). Yet some
attributes retain the semblance of carrying anthropomorphic meanings
when judged from the standpoint of generic resemblances.
Ash‘arism established a refined nuance between attributes of action
(s _
ifat al-fi‘l), which come to be when God intends something and acts,
and those of essence (s _
ifat al-dhat or s _
ifat al-nafs). The contraries of the
attributes of action are permissibly attributable to God. For instance, it
is admissible to state that God is forgiving of repentant believers (as a
reward; thawab), while also affirming that He may be unforgiving of
unrepentant transgressors who break the covenant of God after its
binding (as retribution; ‘iqab). Forgiveness is thus an attribute of action
that admits negation without its resulting contrary being unattributable
to God. As for attributes of essence, their contraries are repugnant: the
negation of omniscience entails ignorance, while the denial of power
results in weakness. Hence the attributes of action are ‘‘negational’’
(salbiyya), while the attributes of essence are classed as ‘‘existential’’
(wujudiyya). In this regard, it was commonly held that the s _
ifat al-dhat
consisted of the following seven attributes: ‘ilm (omniscience), h _
ayat
(life), qudra (power), irada (will), bas _
ar (sight), sam‘ (hearing), and kalam
(speech). An internal controversy emerged over ‘‘willing’’, some holding
that it is unlike the other essential attributes, given that it hints at
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