Abdal Hakim Murad - The Cambridge Companion to Islamic Theology

88 Oliver Leaman
definition of being a Muslim. What needs to be noted about this fascinating
debate is that it is far from obvious which protagonist is the
more ‘‘rational’’ and which the more ‘‘traditional’’. Both positions take
themselves to be both reasonable and grounded in revelation.
The ıman controversy shows how Maturıdism may broadly be
considered a natural derivation from the Murji’ı position.Maturıdı had
provided a secure intellectual basis for the H _
anafı school of jurisprudence,
which made much space for reason and individual judgement. 15
He played an active role in the theological controversies of his time, and
in particular argued with the Mu‘tazilites who were then well ensconced
in Basra. However, while he often agreed with Ash‘arı, he was by no
means a slavish follower, and sought to establish something of a middle
ground between the Mu‘tazila and the Ash‘arites. This middle ground
turned out to be the source of fertile conceptual work for many of the
next centuries of Islamic theology, and it is worth looking at the
structure of Maturıdism to understand how it was able to establish such
a presence in the intellectual world of the time, and indeed ever since.
The principles of evolved Maturıdite theology are quite simple.
First, knowledge can be acquired by using our senses, accepting reports
and, most importantly, through the use of reason. This is why the
Qur’an itself places such reliance on reason, and constantly calls on its
hearers and readers to think rationally about what is set before them.
Reason alone is not enough, though, since it needs to be combined with
revelation, and this leads to a very productive form of tafsır or exegesis
(Maturıdı himself wrote a pioneering work of theological commentary
on the Qur’an). Where a passage in the Qur’an is clear, it must be
accepted as it stands. Where it seems to run foul of another clear verse,
something has to be done: at least one of the verses needs to be
reinterpreted. This may mean that we are constrained to admit that we
do not fully understand it, but it could also be that there exists an
interpretation that would reconcile the two verses, even if this is not the
most obvious one. As in the case of the Mu‘tazilites, a good deal of
reliance is placed on reason, but unlike them this is not allowed complete
sway over the process of interpretation. Reason and revelation
working in tandem resolve theological difficulties, and it is important to
get the balance right between the two.
What is the problem with clinging only to literal and clear meanings?
This is very much the demand of those of Ibn Taymiyya’s persuasion
who see the Book as perfectly easy to understand and in no need
of the importation of any specific rational methods of interpretation. But
the Maturıdıs point out that reason is something that God has given us,
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