Abdal Hakim Murad - The Cambridge Companion to Islamic Theology

God: essence and attributes 133
To show their ‘‘incoherence’’, Ghazalı summarises their arguments
as follows. If an attribute and that to which it is attributed are not the
same, then each one will dispense with the other, or each one will need
the other for it to be, or one will dispense with the other while the other
will be in need of the former. In the first of these cases, both will be
necessary existents due to themselves, and this is implausible. In the
case where each one of them needs the other, then neither is a
‘‘Necessary-Existent-due-to-Itself’’, and this is impossible in the case of
the divine. However, if one has no need of the other, but is needed by it,
then one of them acts as the cause of the other. So in this case, if what is
ascribed with an attribute is in need of it, the one in need is characterised
by a lack, and this does not apply to the divine. 26 Ghazalı’s reply to these
speculations is that the essence of the Necessary Existent is eternal
without agents, and so are His attributes. 27 He also objects to the
falasifa’s claim that the affirmation of the attributes entails that the
First Principle cannot be absolutely self-sufficient, given that since
the First does not need anything other than Himself, therefore He would
not need the attributes. Ghazalı thinks that these philosophical
sophistications are part of a mere ‘‘rhetorical preaching that is extremely
feeble’’. After all, he asserts that ‘‘the attributes of perfection are not
separate from the essence of the Perfect, so as to say that He is in need of
another’’. Like Ash‘arı, he holds that the attributes are not reduced to
the essence itself while being coeternal with it without cause. When the
philosophers affirm that God is a knower, they face the problem of
admitting that there is something superadded to the essence, namely
knowledge.
Most adherents of falsafa hold that God knows only Himself.
However, Avicenna argues that God knows Himself as well as knowing
everything else in a universal manner, given that the knowledge of
particulars implies change in the divine essence. In response, Ghazalı
asks whether God’s knowledge of Himself is identical with His knowledge
of all genera and species. If the philosophers reply that His
knowledge of Himself is indeed identical with His knowledge of
everything else, then their position is untenable. If they say that they are
not identical, then multiplicity is implied. Neither reply convinces.
Furthermore, it cannot be the case that God would know only Himself
given the scriptural affirmation that ‘‘not even the weight of an atom in
the heavens or the earth escapes His knowledge’’ (10:61). Unlike other
philosophers, Avicenna is ‘‘ashamed’’ of asserting that God knows only
Himself and does not know anything else, given that this implies deficiency.
Therefore, in avoiding assertions that might imply change or
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