Abdal Hakim Murad - The Cambridge Companion to Islamic Theology

Theological dimensions of Islamic law 243
for options and modifications at the behest of rightful parties. In Islamic
jurisprudence, the purpose of the rights of God is to uphold the ultimate
objectives of the law: the preservation of religion, life, intellect, children
and property.
All h _
udud are rights of God, as are most other obligations established
by revelation. It is a right of God that binding contracts be written
in unambiguous language. The claim of the poor to adequate sustenance
and the obligation to give homeless children adequate care are rights
of God. Forbidden acts may also fall under this rubric, including the
prohibition of bribes or of legacies that jeopardise the interests of lawful
heirs.
Debts and warranties, on the other hand, belong to the rights of
humanity, because they may be pardoned or written off. Punishments
for slander and murder fall into this grouping. The slandered party may
pardon the abuse and not seek legal action. Exacting punishment for
murder also falls into this category, since the right to execute the guilty
party rests not with the judge but with the victim’s next of kin or
guardians, who are given the option of granting full absolution or a
partial pardon with financial compensation. Imprisonment and other
forms of punishment short of execution, however, fall within the
jurisdiction of the court. In the case of murder, the rights of God and
humanity are said to overlap, since some degree of judiciary punishment
is regarded as God’s right.
Given the religious nature of Islamic law, the issue of innovation
(bid‘a) iscritical.Bid‘a carries negative, neutral and positive meanings.
Its fundamental purpose is to serve as a regulatory mechanism to keep
legal developments in conformity with Islamic principles; but this is
counterbalanced by the creative imperative of ijtihad to enact new rulings
and review older ones. For the majority of classical jurists, any core
revision of credal axioms and ritual acts constituted bid‘a in the negative
sense. For many jurists, the domain of bid‘a was restricted to
matters of belief and ritual and did not include worldly affairs. The
notion that bid‘a stood for the categorical prohibition of change in ritual
and non-ritual matters alike was regarded as absurd in traditional
Islamic law. On the contrary, innovation in the practical disciplines of
the world, like crafts and urban development, was required, and here
bid‘a took on a positive sense. 20
Bid‘a covered a range of different meanings in classical Islamic
jurisprudence, since the varieties of bid‘a fell within the five ethical
categories of the law. Certain types of bid‘a were prohibited or disliked,
but others were obligatory, recommended or simply considered to be
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