Abdal Hakim Murad - The Cambridge Companion to Islamic Theology

Epistemology and divine discourse 289
would have to be like for the sentences expressing them to be literally
true. On this view, it follows that cognition of meaning in the Qur’an is
first and foremost a matter of understanding the truth and the literal
character of divine utterance. If meaning and thought are modelled in
this fashion, epistemic access to figurative meaning is asymmetrically
dependent on the cognition of literal meaning.
Ibn Taymiyya put Ghazalı’s theory under critical stress by arguing
that all that hearers of divine discourse need know is how the divine
discourser intended His speech to be taken. That is, one only has to
grasp its illocutionary force arising from contexts (qara’in) of use
(isti‘mal), plus the intention revealed in God’s habit of address (‘adat
al-mutakallim). Hence, the apprehension of figure in the Qur’an resides
in the apprehension of force. But if this is the case, Ghazalı’s view that
epistemic access to figurative meaning is asymmetrically dependent on
cognition of literal meaning is seriously undermined and the distinction
between h _
aqıqa and majaz is utterly erased. Thus, for Ibn Taymiyya the
question of epistemic access to figural speech does not really arise.
Hermeneutics is the only matter of concern, that is to say, the interpretation
of the pragmatic force of the divine utterance.
This chapter will sketch some of the main features of this debate.
The issues it raises lie at the heart of modern discussions between
Muslim traditionalists, who often side with Ghazalı, and fundamentalists
whose champion is Ibn Taymiyya. But the question of
how Muslims are to understand verses in the Qur’an that refer to God
‘‘sitting’’ or ‘‘descending’’ or having a particular spatial locus are at base
matters of linguistic epistemology. Or rather, they concern the relation
of epistemology to divine discourse.
al-ghazalı’s verbal epistemology
In a work written towards the end of his life, The Essential in
Legal Theory (al-Mustas _
fa min ‘ilm al-us _
ul), Ghazalı defines divine
discourse (kalam) as ‘‘either something a prophet hears from an angel
or an angel from God or a prophet from God or a saint [walı] froman
angel or the Muslim community from the Prophet’’. 4 That is, only to
an appropriately qualified audience does divine speech bear significance.
Hence, knowing what God means and how He means it when
He speaks depends on who hears His voice. There is a difference, in
other words, between the way prophets and saints hear the divine
voice and the way the Muslim community (umma) including its
scholars (‘ulama’) hearsit.
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