Abdal Hakim Murad - The Cambridge Companion to Islamic Theology

Islamic philosophy (falsafa) 69
the nineteenth century Hadı Sabzevarı’s construct, called ‘‘Formal
Body’’ (badan mithlı), helped to demonstrate that the philosophers do
believe in a kind of bodily resurrection, which caused an even greater
degree of acceptance of philosophy by the powerful Shı‘ite ulema. In
short, the continuation of the study of a religiously accepted Islamic
philosophy to this day, albeit in a limited way and confined mostly to
Shı‘ite scholastic centres, has been both directly and indirectly shaped
by Ghazalı’s work.
the fundamentalist reaction
Although H _
anbalism faded before the appeal of Ash‘arism, it
retained its appeal in certain Syrian circles. Its most distinguished
interpreter, Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1326), was a staunchly anti-falsafa jurist
and ideologue of scriptural literalism. Ibn Taymiyya produced a harsh
attack on philosophy, entitled al-Radd ‘ala al-mant _
iqiyyın (Refutation
of the Rational Philosophers), which exercised some influence in the
complex and divided world of H _
anbalı literalism. 25 From the eighteenth
century, such movements, including the Wahhabı and the Salafı, have
shared this dogmatic ideology and actively preach on the need to rid
Islam of all forms of innovations deemed to be un-Islamic, including any
recourse to reason (‘aql). Naturally, such militantly fundamentalist
views, while generally opposed by mainstream ulema, have served to
curtail the study of philosophy in any of its forms.
reconstruction, continuity and
‘‘illumination’’
Philosophy continued in Andalusia, where the texts of Averroes
were instrumental in its development. Other types of philosophical
writing emerged in Andalusian centres such as Cordoba and Seville in
the twelfth century. The dominance of legal strictures, among other
reasons, ensured that the production of philosophical writing by Ibn
Bajja (d. 1138) andIbnṪufayl (d. 1185) took the form of individual works
rather than a trend or school.
Ibn Bajja’s writings were an interpretation of Farabı’s political philosophy.
Ibn Bajja reaffirms the supreme virtues of the perfect, ideal city,
but does not think that it will ever be realised. He argues that darkness
prevails in all actual cities, whose inhabitants live in the cave (after
Plato), perceiving only the ‘‘shadows’’ and not the ‘‘good’’. He does not
accept Farabı’s view of a leadership role for the philosopher in the city
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