Abdal Hakim Murad - The Cambridge Companion to Islamic Theology

86 Oliver Leaman
unlike their ‘‘rationalist’’ opponents, something which might be considered
an even more rational strategy than that of their adversaries, who
evince an uncritical enthusiasm for rationality itself.
A good example of this ability to couple a scepticism about the range
of reason metaphysically with its acceptability in other areas of intellectual
inquiry can be found in the work of the Ash‘arı thinker Ibn
Khaldun (d. 1406). Ibn Khaldun is best known as a highly innovative
social historian and philosopher of history, but he also served as a distinguished
judge, and in that capacity wrote extensively on theology. He
was critical of the unbridled use of reason, and offered perfectly rational
arguments for his critique. Logical techniques, he tells us, are important
if we are to secure clarity on the nature of any subject of discussion, but
it does not follow that we must have confidence in the capacity of reason
to unveil to us the ultimate truths which are accessible to us only
through religion. Often called an anti-rationalist position, this view is in
fact something quite different. It is a rational position based on concerns
about the range of reason when this is used by itself to come to conclusions.
To argue that there are limits to reason is not to attack reason
but is rather to suggest that it be employed in tandem with something
else, perhaps religious knowledge, and most importantly that it be
employed critically.
the murji’ı controversy revisited:
m aturıdism
To give another example of how misleading the nomenclature often
used in theology can be, let us examine briefly the controversy over irja’
or ‘‘postponement’’. 13 As Khalid Blankinship has outlined in chapter 2 of
the present volume, a central controversy in early Islam had evolved
over the nature of belief (ıman): was it primarily a matter of belief and
acts, or of beliefs alone? Could one be a sinner and yet at the same time
remain a sincere Muslim? An important school which was initiated by
Abu H _
anıfa (d. 767) and provided with a solid intellectual foundation by
Abu Mans _
ur al-Maturıdı (d. 944) argued that even the worst sinner
cannot be treated as an unbeliever, and that the decision as to whether
he is really a believer should be left to God (compare Qur’an 9:106).
H _
anafı jurists, basing themselves largely on Maturıdı’s work, argued
that ıman does not genuinely increase or decrease, unlike taqwa or
piety, which does fluctuate. The Ash‘arites took the opposite view on
ıman, arguing also that we are strictly limited in what we can work out
by ourselves using reason alone. For the Maturıdıs, by contrast, even
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