Understanding earnings quality - MIT Sloan School of Management
Understanding earnings quality - MIT Sloan School of Management
Understanding earnings quality - MIT Sloan School of Management
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measured by stock returns. Four firm characteristics deserve a separate discussion: 1) Performance<br />
and losses; 2) Growth and investment; 3) Debt; and 4) Size.<br />
5.1.1 Firm performance<br />
The most commonly studied firm characteristic that affects EQ proxies is performance. The<br />
studies hypothesize that weak financial performance provides incentives for <strong>earnings</strong> management. 41<br />
Petroni (1992) documents downwardly biased discretionary reserves for claim losses for financially<br />
weak P&C insurers. DeFond and Park (1997) document income smoothing in which firms manage<br />
<strong>earnings</strong> upward (downward) when unmanaged performance is poor (good) and when expected<br />
performance is strong (weak). 42 Balsam, Haw, and Lilien (1995) suggest that firms use discretion to<br />
time the adoption <strong>of</strong> income increasing accounting methods when the firm’s change in ROA is<br />
lowest. Keating and Zimmerman (1999) suggest that poorly performing firms use the discretion<br />
allowed in accounting standard adoption to their advantage. Financially weak firms also disclose<br />
more internal control weaknesses (Doyle, Ge, and McVay, 2007a) and are more likely to correct<br />
previously reported <strong>earnings</strong>, which is interpreted as ex post evidence <strong>of</strong> <strong>earnings</strong> management<br />
(Kinney and McDaniel, 1989).<br />
Francis, Hanna, and Vincent (1996) find no evidence that write-<strong>of</strong>fs, after controlling for the<br />
likelihood that assets are impaired, are associated with poor performance. The only study in our<br />
database that finds negative evidence is done by DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1994). For a<br />
sample <strong>of</strong> firms with persistent losses, they find that the accruals reflect the underlying economics<br />
41<br />
Lee, Li, and Yue (2006) create a stylized model in which firms with higher performance overstate <strong>earnings</strong> more. The<br />
model predictions result from assumptions about the cost <strong>of</strong> <strong>earnings</strong> management and about how <strong>earnings</strong> performance<br />
and <strong>earnings</strong> growth affect the proportion <strong>of</strong> true economic <strong>earnings</strong> in total reported <strong>earnings</strong>. Their empirical evidence<br />
is mixed.<br />
42<br />
Elgers, Pfeiffer, and Porter (2003), however, suggest that the results in DeFond and Park (1997) are sensitive to the<br />
method used to “back out” abnormal accruals.<br />
81