Understanding earnings quality - MIT Sloan School of Management
Understanding earnings quality - MIT Sloan School of Management
Understanding earnings quality - MIT Sloan School of Management
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<strong>quality</strong> and the <strong>quality</strong> <strong>of</strong> M&A decisions, the argument that cross-sectional variation in many BOD<br />
characteristics can explain cross-sectional variation in <strong>earnings</strong> management is less compelling.<br />
Tests based on an overall governance score as a proxy for internal controls that might constrain<br />
<strong>earnings</strong> management must assume that variation in the score is correlated with the <strong>quality</strong> <strong>of</strong><br />
mechanisms that specifically affect <strong>earnings</strong> management opportunities or incentives. Tests that<br />
assume that the monitoring role <strong>of</strong> governance affects dimensions <strong>of</strong> <strong>earnings</strong> <strong>quality</strong> other than<br />
<strong>earnings</strong> management, such as conservatism, face even greater challenges (e.g., Garcia Lara et al.,<br />
2009).<br />
Many internal control mechanisms are substitutes or complements. For example, Krishnan<br />
(2005) emphasizes the complementarity <strong>of</strong> two internal control mechanisms (i.e., audit committees<br />
and internal control procedures). Larcker et al. (2007) more thoroughly address the problem and<br />
argue that this causes econometric problems (e.g., inconsistent coefficient estimates) when using<br />
only a limited set <strong>of</strong> corporate governance measures.<br />
5.3.2 Internal control procedures<br />
Using internal control disclosures under SOX, Doyle et al. (2007b) find that firms with<br />
material weaknesses in internal control procedures over financial reporting have lower accruals<br />
<strong>quality</strong> (measured based on Dechow and Dichev, 2002), higher discretionary accruals, lower<br />
<strong>earnings</strong> persistence, and a higher likelihood <strong>of</strong> restatements than other firms. Ashbaugh-Skaife et<br />
al. (2008) further find that firms that have remediated their internal control weaknesses tend to have<br />
improved accruals <strong>quality</strong>. 54 The predicted association between internal controls and accruals and<br />
54 Both Doyle et al. and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. attempt to control for the self-selection bias associated with a manager’s<br />
choice <strong>of</strong> internal controls. The selection bias associated with using internal control deficiency reports under SOX as a<br />
proxy for poor <strong>quality</strong> is a separate issue and is discussed in Section 2.4.3.<br />
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