Understanding earnings quality - MIT Sloan School of Management
Understanding earnings quality - MIT Sloan School of Management
Understanding earnings quality - MIT Sloan School of Management
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5.1.5 Summary <strong>of</strong> firm characteristics as a determinant <strong>of</strong> <strong>earnings</strong> <strong>quality</strong><br />
Our review yields the following insights. First, fundamental firm characteristics are<br />
associated with accounting method choice. Any studies that predict accounting choices as an<br />
indication <strong>of</strong> <strong>earnings</strong> <strong>quality</strong> must control for these fundamental differences before inferring<br />
opportunism. Second, the evidence that weak performance provides incentives for <strong>earnings</strong><br />
management is fairly well-established. The extent to which opportunities constrain the behavior,<br />
however, is a less actively researched topic (see DeAngelo et al., 1994). Third, while the evidence<br />
suggests a relation between size and <strong>earnings</strong> management, it is impossible to generalize any sort <strong>of</strong><br />
implications for a relation between size and <strong>earnings</strong> <strong>quality</strong> on any dimension, given that firm size<br />
could proxy for various underlying constructs (e.g., political visibility, information environment<br />
etc.).<br />
Finally, equity investors appear to unwind firm’s incentives arising from debt contracts to<br />
manage <strong>earnings</strong> (Aboody et al., 1999). The evidence, however, on investors’ ability to unwind<br />
incentives and to incorporate an expectation <strong>of</strong> rational <strong>earnings</strong> management into their pricing is<br />
limited, even for debt-related incentives, which are among the strongest documented incentives for<br />
<strong>earnings</strong> management and potentially the most transparent to investors. Other than Aboody et al.<br />
(1999) and Shivakumar (2000), we do not have studies in our database that condition equity market<br />
reactions to <strong>earnings</strong> on investors’ ability to unwind <strong>earnings</strong> management that represents a value-<br />
maximizing activity that is the outcome <strong>of</strong> efficient contracting.<br />
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