That Someone Guilty Be Punished - International Center for ...

4. Contextual considerations
Our interlocutors offered several explanations for the persistent patterns described above.
Jasna Bakšić Muftić offered a social-psychological insight: “Sometimes the Hague Tribunal
is like a mirror and if you see an ugly face, you reject it. But you know it’s true. But officially,
you say ‘I’m nicer, etc.’” 637 Others see the hand of historical memory, which weighs heavily
in the Balkans, at play in many Bosnians’ reluctance to accept the truth about crimes committed
by members of their own ethnic group. Reflecting on why many Bosnian Croats are
reluctant to accept the guilt of Bosnian Croat defendants whom the ICTY convicted of war
crimes, Dobrila Govedarica invoked a broader context: Croats, she recalled, have long been
blamed in the Balkans for crimes committed in World War II, when their state was allied
with Nazi Germany. “Finally, they get to a point where the Serbs, who took almost all the
credit for being on the right side in World War II, are the most guilty ones” in the 1990s war.
In addition, there is a deep-rooted perception that those who defend themselves cannot, by
definition, commit a crime. In this setting, there are “strong psychological reasons to resist
accepting responsibility.” 638
But while psychological dynamics are important, virtually everyone in Bosnia faults
political leaders for perpetuating ethnic perspectives. As Mervan Miraščija put it, “politicians
use [the ICTY] for their own aims.” 639 Likewise noting that “politicians maintain ethnic divisionism
to retain power,” Savima Sali-Terzić added that the attention Bosniak politicians pay
to ICTY indictments “is a tool in pre-elections.” 640
During the past year-and-a-half, RS leader Milorad Dodik has threatened secession if the
Serb entity is not granted greater autonomy, 641 and provoked a political crisis when he issued
a decree purporting to nullify state institutions. Acknowledging Serb responsibility for genocide,
many point out, is hardly supportive of his political agenda. Conversely, Bosniak leader
Haris Siladžić condemns the Serb entity as a creature of genocide642 and pivoted off the ICJ’s
February 2007 genocide judgment to demand that Srebrenica be wrested from Serb control. 643
While many Srebrenica survivors we interviewed agree with his position, Bosnian intellectuals
widely believe that Bosniak political leaders have nurtured victims’ suffering to entrench their
own political positions, just as Serb leaders have perpetuated an anti-ICTY stance to advance
a self-serving political agenda. 644 A point emphasized by many of our interlocutors is that
Bosniak leaders have “used and misused victims’ associations.” 645 More generally, speaking
of the issue of war crimes, Dobrila Govedarica noted, “political leaders aren’t very responsible
when this issue is about.” 646
Analyzing Bosnia’s complex political landscape is beyond the province of this report,
but it is necessary to note that the ICTY’s impact in Bosnia, as elsewhere in the Balkans, is
mediated by domestic political figures and the local media. With ethnic relationships in Bosnia
tenser than they have been in years, 647 Bosnians like Emir Suljagić wonder, “How do you translate
judicial findings of the Tribunal into political facts under these kind of circumstances?” 648
98 TRUTH AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT