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That Someone Guilty Be Punished - International Center for ...

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This is not to minimize the ICTY’s role in creating the BWCC and ensuring its effective<br />

operation. 884 Yet the Bosnia experience highlights an important lesson <strong>for</strong> other contexts in<br />

which international courts may play a role in addressing mass atrocities. Specialized courts<br />

may play a necessary and essential role in prosecuting certain cases but their capacity will<br />

always be limited. Accordingly, planning <strong>for</strong> prosecutions should always take account of the<br />

role that regular courts ultimately should play in complementing their work.<br />

Just as important, the ICTY’s experience highlights an important lesson that the SDWC<br />

failed to take on board in its crucial start-up years: Specialized war crimes bodies like the<br />

ICTY, the BWCC, and the SDWC will surely be faulted if they devote their finite resources to<br />

prosecuting comparatively low-level suspects. Just as the ICTY was faulted <strong>for</strong> taking on comparatively<br />

low-level cases in its earlier years—a misstep eventually addressed in part through<br />

the vehicle of 11 bis transfers—the SDWC’s early indictments have drawn wide criticism. 885<br />

The pith of this criticism is that the SDWC has failed to develop a coherent approach to<br />

determining the cases it will prosecute886 and those it will refer to district or cantonal courts<br />

<strong>for</strong> prosecution. 887 The Collegium of Prosecutors of BiH took a first cut at this question in<br />

guidelines adopted in late 2004. Under those guidelines, the Court of BiH would try “highly<br />

sensitive” cases, while “sensitive cases may, contingent upon the discretion of the Chief Prosecutor,<br />

be remitted <strong>for</strong> trial to the cantonal and district courts.” 888 It quickly became clear, however,<br />

that the criteria of “highly sensitive” and “sensitive” provided scant practical guidance.<br />

Two years after these criteria were adopted, Branko Perić, then president of the HJPC,<br />

stated bluntly, “The prosecutor’s office doesn’t have a strategy.” 889 According to Perić, the state<br />

prosecutor had “taken over more than 100 war crimes cases from cantonal courts, … and then<br />

they were overloaded with cases they can’t solve” given the SDWC’s finite capacity. 890 In his<br />

view—one that is widely shared—many of the cases taken over by the state court included<br />

comparatively low-level suspects, which should be left <strong>for</strong> prosecution by cantonal and district<br />

courts. 891<br />

Delays in developing clear and principled criteria <strong>for</strong> selecting cases has left victims to<br />

wonder why their own cases did not merit prosecution at the state level while other victims’<br />

cases did. 892 In a country starkly divided along ethnic lines, the seeming lack of neutral principles<br />

<strong>for</strong> selection has needlessly provided further grist <strong>for</strong> Bosnian Serbs’ recurring charge that<br />

case selection is fueled by ethnic bias. 893 (Reflecting the fact that Serb <strong>for</strong>ces committed the<br />

largest proportion of war crimes, the SDWC has indicted more Serbs than Bosniaks or Croats.)<br />

Closely related to the importance of finalizing appropriate criteria <strong>for</strong> the selection of<br />

cases and ensuring that these are understood by the Bosnian public, the SDWC needs to make<br />

a realistic assessment of the number of cases it will be able to prosecute, prioritize its caseload<br />

accordingly, and manage public expectations about what it can realistically achieve. Otherwise,<br />

it risks repeating a major misstep by the ICTY—devoting substantial resources to prosecuting<br />

comparatively low-level cases in its early years and then having to readjust its caseload in the<br />

face of finite time. 894<br />

128 IMPACT ON DOMESTIC WAR CRIMES PROSECUTIONS

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