That Someone Guilty Be Punished - International Center for ...

9. Interview with Fadil Budnjo, president, Association of Families of Killed and Missing from
Foča and Kalinovik, Ilidža, July 24, 2009.
10. We explore some of the reasons for this early approach in Chapter II.
11. All chapters look at this issue to some extent, but Chapter IV does so in the most detail.
12. Throughout this report we use the word “war crimes” as shorthand for the three types of
international crimes that can be prosecuted by the ICTY—serious violations of the laws of armed
conflict, which are commonly called “war crimes;” crimes against humanity; and genocide—rather
than in a legally precise sense.
13. Plavšić nonetheless provided testimony under court order in one case. See Chapter IV.C.2.
14. Interview with Muharem Murselović, member of Republika Srpska National Assembly,
President of the RS Parlamentarians Club for the Party for BiH (Haris Silajdzic Party), Banja Luka,
July 15, 2009.
15. Interview with Sevima Sali-Terzić, senior legal advisor, BiH Constitutional Court, Sarajevo,
Nov. 30, 2006.
16. Patricia M. Wald, Tyrants on Trial: Keeping Order in the Courtroom (Open Society Justice
Initiative, 2009), available at http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/international_justice/
articles_publications/publications/tyrants_20090911/tyrants_20090911.pdf.
17. This is the highest figure, from 1996, when the International Force (IFOR) in Bosnia had
60,000 troops, of which “50,000 troops [were] provided by NATO nations and approximately
10,000 from non-NATO contributors.” Larry K. Wentz (ed.), Lessons From Bosnia: The IFOR Experience,
National Defense University/Command and Control Research Program, 1998, www.dodccrp.
org/files/Wentz_Bosnia.pdf, p. 477. The Stabilization Force (SFOR), the legal successor to IFOR,
“was activated on 20 December 1996,” Wentz, p. 480. In January 1997, there were “approximately
32,000 troops deployed in B[iH] with contributions from all the NATO nations and from the 18
non-NATO countries”. S/1997/81, 27 January 1997 (Monthly report to the UN SC on SFOR operations,
para. 2), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N97/023/06/PDF/N9702306.
pdf?OpenElement.
18. Interview with Sevima Sali-Terzić, senior legal advisor, BiH Constitutional Court, Sarajevo,
Nov. 30, 2006. Karadžić was arrested in July 2008, almost one and a half years after we interviewed
Sali-Teržić.
19. Id.
20. Interview with Jasminka Džumhur, national legal officer, Office of the UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights, Sarajevo, June 11, 2007.
21. Interview with Nidžara Ahmetašević, editor, Balkan Investigative Reporting Network in BiH,
Sarajevo, July 13, 2009.
22. Id.
23. Ian Traynor, “Radovan Karadzic fails to appear for war crimes trial,” The Guardian, Oct. 26,
2009; David Charter, “Fury as Karadzic refuses to turn up for war crimes trial,” The Times, Oct. 27,
2009. When the judges threatened to impose counsel if Karadžić continued his boycott, his trial
was ultimately delayed until March 1, 2010 in order to give imposed counsel time to defend Karadžić
if he continued to obstruct the proceedings. Upon the brief resumption of his trial in March 2010,
Karadžić claimed that the war was “just and holy” and that the massacres at Srebrenica were a
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