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estored to them. The early return of refugees and displaced persons is an important objective
of the settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Parties confirm that
they will accept the return of such persons who have left their territory, including those who
have been accorded temporary protection by third countries.
Dayton Peace Agreement, Annex 7, 1, at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/dayann7.
html.
527. See id., 5.
528. Confidential interview with ICTY judge.
529. Tim Judah, “The Fog of Justice,” 51 N.Y. Rev. Books, Jan. 15, 2004.
530. See UNHCR, “Update on Conditions for Return to Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Jan. 2005 (an
estimated 2.2 million people were forcibly displaced during the war); Roberto Belloni, State Building
and International Intervention in Bosnia, p. 125 (2008) [hereafter State Building] (approximately 2.3
mission people left their homes during and in the immediate aftermath of the conflict).
531. Roberto Belloni, State Building, p. 126.
532. Id., p. 133.
533. Id., p. 134.
534. Id., p. 130.
535. Id., pp. 129-130.
536. By the end of 2008, the UNHCR reported that there had been 467,297 total minority
returns to place of origin in Bosnia since the Dayton accords entered into effect. UNHCR in BiH,
Statistics Package, Dec. 31, 2008, at http://www.unhcr.ba/updatedec08/SP_12_2008.pdf. Such data
likely overstate the number of actual numbers of persons who have made their original homes their
principal residence. According to the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in BiH, the UNHCR’s
data are based on formal returns of property and do not reflect such facts as whether the original
owner actually returned to his/her home or instead immediately resold it. See Helsinki Committee
for Human Rights in BiH, Report on the Status of Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Analysis
for the period January-December 2005), p. 2, at http://www.bh-hchr.org/Reports/reportHR2005.htm.
537. Belloni writes that “[h]ard line politics, international isolation and lack of reconstruction
funding all made Prijedor a very difficult and unlikely case for successful minority return” and
“international return schemes neglected this municipality.” Id., p. 137.
538. Isabelle Wesselingh and Arnuad Vaulerin, Raw Memory: Prijedor, Laboratory of Ethnic Cleansing,
p. 90 (SAQI in association with the Bosnian Institute, 2005).
539. Id., p. 91. Writing in 2005, Wesselingh and Vaulerin reported that over 12,000 Bosnian
Croats and Muslims had returned to Prijedor since the war’s end. Id., p. 92.
540. Id., p. 92. Among the reasons for this, Belloni cites the desire of European countries to
repatriate the large numbers of Bosnians who had become refugees during the war. See Roberto
Belloni, State Building, p. 131. According to staff of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
in Bosnia, there may have been a disproportionately large number of refugees in Western Europe
from Prijedor, because the worst atrocities in Prijedor occurred early in the war, when European
countries were more welcoming of Bosnian refugees. Thus when these countries’ welcome wore
out, there were a large number of exiles from Prijedor who had to return to Bosnia and had not
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