That Someone Guilty Be Punished - International Center for ...
That Someone Guilty Be Punished - International Center for ...
That Someone Guilty Be Punished - International Center for ...
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emorse <strong>for</strong> crimes committed in their name. For many, this is seen as a precondition to<br />
reconciliation; <strong>for</strong> others, this type of acknowledgment is seen as a proxy <strong>for</strong> reconciliation—<br />
a key indicator of how far Bosnia has come in the process of social repair.<br />
The issue of acknowledgment by Serbs looms especially large in the aspirations of many<br />
(non-Serb) Bosnians <strong>for</strong> another reason. As we noted in Chapter III and discuss in more detail<br />
here, denial has been a distinctive, though hardly uni<strong>for</strong>m, feature of Serb discourse about<br />
wartime atrocities committed by Serbs. As Saša Madacki put it, “one part of the country is in<br />
constant denial.” 587 Serbs’ unwillingness to acknowledge the complete truth of “ethnic cleansing”<br />
has deepened survivors’ personal suffering and perpetuated the social rupture between<br />
Bosnia’s ethnic communities. Journalist Gojko <strong>Be</strong>rić evoked the latter when, speculating about<br />
what would happen if the ICTY were to convict Radovan Karadžić of genocide but this finding<br />
were rejected by Bosnian Serbs, he said: “It’s not justice. In that case, we will have no trust<br />
among people.” 588<br />
Looking to broader issues of political community, persistent <strong>for</strong>ms of denial are antithetical<br />
to the notion of a national society that has achieved “common agreement on an interpretation<br />
of the past.” 589 Although no one we interviewed believes that dispelling the fog of denial<br />
or justification would come solely or even principally through the work of the ICTY, those who<br />
emphasized this point hoped that the Tribunal’s findings of individual guilt, achieved through<br />
the crucible of criminal process, would radically shrink the margins of plausible denial. 590<br />
Many of our interlocutors—in particular urban intellectuals—emphasized that in their<br />
view, a crucial indicator of the ICTY’s success in fostering acknowledgement is whether leaders<br />
and citizens within each of the country’s three major ethnic groups accept that members<br />
of their own ethnic group committed atrocities and acknowledge that this was wrong. Some<br />
made clear that this is important not only as a gesture of reciprocal acknowledgment and<br />
remorse. It is also, they say, how it will be clear that Bosnia has transcended the divisions<br />
that make most citizens view matters of consequence, such as responsibility <strong>for</strong> war crimes,<br />
through an ethnic prism. What is important is that Bosnians recover a common commitment<br />
to core values—that war crimes are wrong, whoever commits them.<br />
In this chapter we address two principal questions: First, to what extent have Bosnians<br />
taken on board the factual conclusions set <strong>for</strong>th in ICTY judgments and acknowledged that<br />
wartime atrocities committed by members of their own ethnic group deserve unqualified<br />
condemnation? Second, within the bounds of what is possible and appropriate <strong>for</strong> a judicial<br />
institution, has the ICTY per<strong>for</strong>med as well as it could in ensuring that facts established in its<br />
judgments as well as basic in<strong>for</strong>mation about the nature of its work, are known and understood<br />
in Bosnia?<br />
90 TRUTH AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT