That Someone Guilty Be Punished - International Center for ...

and disruption of war and immediate post-war, but also emerged from a communist culture in
which there was no separation of powers and no tradition of judicial independence. Furthermore,
judges and prosecutors continue to lack the capacity to deal with complex cases….”).
703. Id., p. 5.
704. Donlon, Rule of Law, supra, p. 267.
705. See Chris Hedges, “Muslim Detention of Bosnian Serbs Threatens Truce,” New York Times,
Feb. 7, 1996. The Bosnian government arrested several other Bosnian Serbs during the same
period, but the arrest of these two men proved especially controversial.
706. Richard Holbrooke, To End A War, p. 332 (Random House, 1998).
707. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, War Crimes Trials Before the Domestic
Courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Progress and Obstacles, p. 5 (March 2005).
708. Id. See also Stacey Sullivan, “Bosnian Serb Leaders Halt Contacts with Government; Arrest
of 8 Military Men Threatens Fragile Peace,” Washington Post, Feb. 7, 1996.
709. Chris Hedges, “Muslim Detention of Bosnian Serbs Threatens Truce,” New York Times, Feb.
7, 1996.
710. See Jack Kelley, “Bosnia arrests 2 top Serbs, seeks charges,” USA Today, Feb. 6, 1996.
711. See ICTY Press Release, “Tribunal’s Prosecutor requests Bosnia to provisionally arrest General
Ðjukić and Colonol Krsmanović,” CC/PIO/031-E, at http://www.icty.org/sid/7419. Contemporaneous
press reporting suggested that Goldstone’s intervention helped dispel the crisis provoked by the
arrests. See, for example, Stacey Sullivan, “Bosnian Serb Leaders Halt Contacts with Government;
Arrest of 8 Military Men Threatens Fragile Peace,” Washington Post, Feb. 7, 1996 (reporting that the
commander of NATO forces in Bosnia, Adm. Leighton W. Smith, Jr., had “released a statement saying
he was reassured that the Bosnian government would abide by the decision of the war crimes tribunal”).
So, too, does a more recent account: see Donlon, Rule of Law, supra, p. 263. Richard Holbrooke,
the lead negotiator at Dayton, had a different view of the ICTY’s involvement, which was illustrative of
the international community’s general approach during the Tribunal’s early years, often downgrading
the pursuit of justice in the belief that this could destabilize a fragile peace. In his memoir of the Dayton
peace negotiations and their early implementation, Holbrooke asserted that, since the two Serbian
officers had been apprehended in a manner that violated the Dayton accord, “we would normally have
insisted that the Muslims release them immediately.” Holbrooke continued: “But Justice Goldstone
complicated matters considerably; from the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague, he
issued a warrant for the two men—even though they had not been indicted.” Richard Holbrooke, To
End a War, p. 332 (Random House, 1998). Although General Ðjukić was soon indicted by the ICTY,
he was provisionally released due to ill health in late April 1996 and the proceedings against him
were terminated following his death in May 1996. See ICTY Press Release, “Ðjukić case terminated
by the death of the accused,” CC/PIO/082-E, June 3, 1996, at http://www.icty.org/sid/7346. The ICTY
released the other potential suspect, Col. Krsmanović, without charge in late March 1996. See ICTY
Press Release, “Colonel Krsmanović remanded back to Bosnia and Herzegovina,” CC/PIO/058, Apr.
3, 1996, at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p058-e.htm.
712. Holbrooke, supra, at 334. Like other commitments set forth in the Rome Agreement, the
Rules of the Road undertaking was understood primarily as an “action to strengthen and advance the
peace process.” Agreed Measures, preamble (Feb. 18, 1996), at http://www.nato.int/IFOR/rome/rome2.
htm.
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