That Someone Guilty Be Punished - International Center for ...

58. Richard J. Goldstone, For Humanity: Reflections of a War Crimes Investigator, p. 105 (2000).
59. Id.
60. Id., pp. 105–06.
61. Much of the evidence supporting the indictment of Nikolić came from a source who had
fled the region and who had been a guard at a camp where Nikolić murdered, tortured, and illegally
detained Muslim prisoners. The New York Times had published a series of articles based on
this man’s account in August 1994. See Roger Cohen, “Tribunal Charges Serbian Camp Commander
with War Crimes,” New York Times, Nov. 8, 1994. Although indicted in November 1994,
Nikolić eluded arrest until April 20, 2000. See ICTY Web site at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragan_nikolic/cis/en/cis_nikolic_dragan.pdf.
62. See Monika Nalepa, “Why Do They Return? Evaluating the Impact of ICTY Justice on Reconciliation,”
p. 30 (Jan. 26, 2007). Michelle Nicholasen, “What about Milosevic?,” Frontline Online (no
date available) at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/karadzic/trial/milosevic.html.
63. Charles Trueheart, “War Crimes Tribunal Gathers Momentum; 4 Trials Underway for Atrocities
in Bosnia, but top Figures Remain at Large,” Washington Post, Mar. 3, 1998.
64. See Gary J. Bass, “Settling with the Enemy; The Dicey Politics of Negotiating Peace in the
Balkans with Accused War Criminals,” Washington Post, Oct. 29, 1995 (describing opposition by
Europeans to the idea of the ICTY since it was first proposed on the ground “that pursuing this sort
of justice would interfere with peace-making further down the road”); Carla Anne Robbins, “Balkan
Judgments; World Again Confronts Moral Issues Involved in War-Crimes Trials; Some Feel U.N.
Delays Peace in Former Yugoslavia by Pursuing Atrocities,” Wall Street Journal, July 13, 1993.
65. See Jonathan S. Landay, “Opening the docket: trials of a war tribunal,” Christian Science
Monitor, Nov. 16, 1994.
66. The Bosnian Serbs’ military chief, Ratko Mladić, was also routinely engaged by European
diplomats. See Human Rights Watch, Selling Justice Short: Why Accountability Matters for Peace, p.
25 (July 2009). http://soc.kuleuven.be/iieb/CPRS/cahiers/Vol83.pdf, at 42–43 and 60–61. Later,
the ICTY prosecutor—by then, Louise Arbour—would face a similar challenge. Her concern that
Slobodan Milošević would escape prosecution if she did not act quickly was among the primary
reasons for filing the first Milošević indictment only two months after the beginning of the massive
campaign of ethnic cleansing undertaken by the Serbian and Yugoslav forces in Kosovo in 1999. See
Diane F. Orentlicher, Shrinking the Space for Denial: The Impact of the ICTY in Serbia (Open Society
Justice Initiative, 2008), at 35 and 112.
67. As we discuss further in Chapter IV, while Srebrenica is known for the massacre of well
over 7,000 males in July 1995, the siege began years earlier.
68. See Pierre Hazan, Justice in a Time of War, p. 66.
69. Richard J. Goldstone, For Humanity, p. 103.
70. Security Council Resolution 836, adopted on June 4, 1993, authorized the UN Protection
Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia and UN Member States to use force to protect so-called “safe areas”
that were under siege. These included Sarajevo, Bihać, Tuzla, Srebrenica, Žepa, and Goražde.
71. Gary Bass writes that the late August 1995 shelling of a marketplace in Sarajevo was, coming
soon after the Srebrenica assault, the last straw that prompted NATO’s response. See Gary Bass,
Stay the Hand of Vengeance, p. 231.
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