That Someone Guilty Be Punished - International Center for ...

independent, impartial and professional judiciary, and to ensure the provision of a professional and
efficient court system and prosecutorial service.” Id., art. 4.
890. Id. Perić went on to say that he was not sure of the exact number of cases that the state
prosecutor had taken on but affirmed the basic point that the SDWC was “overloaded.”
891. Id. When asked about these concerns in a 2006 interview, then Chief Prosecutor of BiH
Marinko Jurčević expressed frustration, saying that “the international community isn’t offering us
enough of their capacities … so we’ve tried to organize in the best way with our limited capacity.”
Interview, Sarajevo, Dec. 4, 2006. For adoption of the “yellow book”and other related developments,
see ICLS Report, supra.
892. Beyond the symbolic distinction between the state court and others in Bosnia, only the
former can clearly impose the comparatively high sentences authorized by the CPC.
893. See Maja Milavić, “Court faces ‘political’ smears,” BIRN’s Justice Report, Sept. 8, 2006, at
http://www.bim.ba/en/26/10/948/?tpl=58.
894. Indeed, to former Judge Vehid Šehić it is “obvious” that once a national war crimes strategy
is adopted, the state court “will have to reallocate cases … to cantonal and district courts.” Interview
with Vehid Šehić, president, Citizens Forum of Tuzla, Tuzla, July 15, 2009.
895. Pursuant to the National War Crimes Strategy adopted in December 2008, the determination
of which cases would be prosecuted before the state court would be guided in particular by the
gravity of the crimes and the status of the accused, while taking account of factors that include “a “[c]
orrelation between the case and other cases and possible perpetrators”; the [i]nterests of victims and
witnesses” and the “[c]onsequences of the crime for the local community.” “Criteria for the Review
of War Crimes Cases,” National War Crimes Prosecution Strategy, Annex A, p. 3. The first page of
these guidelines invoke the criterion of “complexity,” but the more detailed guidelines set forth on
pages 2-3 focus on the criteria noted in the text. See also Humanitarian Law Center and Documenta,
Transitional Justice in Post-Yugoslav Countries: 2007 Report, p. 10 (hereafter HLC/Documenta, 2007
TJ Report).
896. SDWC, DRAFT Prosecution Guidelines, Practice Direction No. 5: Prioritization (Feb. 9,
2009).
897. Interview with David Schwendiman, then head of SDWC, Sarajevo, July 14, 2009. As of
July 2009, the SDWC had “identified approximately 1400 situations and events that need to be …
investigated and where sufficient evidence exists to prosecute those responsible for them.” David
Schwendiman, “Background and Introduction,” p. 41 (July 2009) (on file with author). In July
2009, the president of the state court published a highly critical essay charging that deadlines
relating to this and other elements of the national strategy had been routinely disregarded. See
Meddžida Kreso, “Strategy Not Yet Implemented,” BIRN’s Justice Report, July 3, 2009, at http://
bim.ba/en/173/10/20794/?tpl=58. See also Denis Džidić, “War Crimes Strategy Faces Credibility
Crisis,” BIRN’s Justice Report, Aug. 4, 2009, at http://www.bim.ba/en/178/10/21472/?tpl=58. The
then head of the SDWC has challenged claims that entity prosecutors are frustrating completion of
the database, writing “No data or information are being concealed.” Letter from David Schwendiman,
then head of SDWC, to Nidžara Ahmetašević, p. 2, July 6, 2009 (on file with author). The
department has, moreover, been making greater efforts to explain its selection of cases to the public,
which then SDWC head David Schwendiman dates to November 2007. Interview with David
Schwendiman, then head of SDWC, Sarajevo, July 14, 2009 But the SDWC’s resources are neces-
THAT SOMEONE GUILTY BE PUNISHED 205