Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline

14 Bendik Solum Whist
While gas is more environmentally friendly than coal, it is nonetheless a
fossil fuel and not emission-free. Based on these considerations, the
agency thus ‘strongly encourage[s] the government to reconsider the
decision to phase out nuclear power’ (IEA 2007: 9).
This dilemma has caused much debate within the grand coalition of the
Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democrats (SPD). It
was the latter that, whilst in government with the Green Party, agreed on
the nuclear phase-out, and the party still stands by its decision.
CDU/CSU, however, has been somewhat critical of the plan, and this has
inevitably led to tensions within the government on questions of dependence
on Russia, what a climate-friendly energy mix should look like, and
how electricity and gas prices can be kept low. Spiegel (2007a) concludes
that on questions of energy ‘the views of Merkel’s Christian Democrats
differ from those of the Social Democrats on virtually every important
issue.’ If this was not discernible during the 2006 Russo-Ukrainian gas
dispute, it became particularly apparent following the 8-10 January 2007
Russo-Belarusian energy dispute, during which Russia halted oil
deliveries through the Druzhba-pipeline, which passes through Belarus
and supplies Germany with 20 per cent of its annual oil imports. The
reason for the disruption of oil supplies was a commercial dispute
between Moscow and Minsk, which was related to Russian export tariffs
on oil to Belarus, and the transit fees demanded by the latter. On 9
January 2007, when the dispute was still unsettled, Chancellor Merkel
stated that, first of all, it was ‘not acceptable for energy transit or supplier
countries to halt deliveries without consultation,’ and secondly, that ‘we
must think about the consequences of shutting down nuclear power
plants’ (Deutsche Welle 2007). As late as June 2008 Merkel reiterated
this position and argued that ‘the phase-out decision was absolutely
wrong’ (WNN 2008a). The Chancellor’s and CDU/CSU’s problem,
however, is that SPD will not budge on the phase-out plan. For instance,
the relationship between the Minister of Economics, Michael Glos
(CSU), and Minister of the Environment, Sigmar Gabriel (SPD), has been
described as ‘an embittered small-scale war’ over energy issues within
the government (Spiegel 2007a). As of August 2008 the German government
has not changed its nuclear phase-out policy, and this may also help
understand why Berlin’s stance on Nord Stream has persisted despite
Merkel’s tougher line with Russia. In light of the effect that Russia’s
energy disputes with neighbouring transit states has had on Germany’s
perception of energy security, and considering the current improbability
of a change in the nuclear phase-out plan, the pipeline through the Baltic
Sea makes much sense.
Another contributing factor is the strong energy lobby in Germany. First,
the two second-largest shareholders of the Nord Stream consortium,
E.ON Ruhrgas and BASF/Wintershall, are both German companies, and
they inevitably have a strong economic interest in the project. Second,
Lucas (2008: 19) has argued that Germany indeed has a ‘pro-Russian
business lobby that has beguiled the foreign-policy establishment.’
Decades of trade and investment in Russia have made many German
companies willing to go to great lengths to make sure Russo-German
relations remain friction free. So even if Chancellor Merkel, for political
reasons, wanted to lead Germany in another direction on the pipeline