Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline

7 Conclusions
An important aim of this report has been to show that the multitude of
interpretations of Nord Stream makes the project more than ‘just a
pipeline’. The controversy surrounding the project indicates that most of
the states in the region consider the pipeline to be of great importance,
but they do so for different reasons. Therefore, the overall objective has
been to provide plausible explanations as to why the reactions to Nord
Stream have differed to such an extent. Where relevant, attempts have
also been made to scrutinise the different arguments and reveal their
strengths and weaknesses.
The thematic organisation of the analytical chapters enabled broad coverage
of the different interpretations of Nord Stream and simplified the
comparison of debates and views. For the sake of clarity, however, it may
now be helpful recapitulate the main findings from a more state-based
perspective.
For Germany Nord Stream may be of pivotal importance for several
reasons. To contextualise the issue, it is first worth mentioning what
Germany represents on the European continent and internationally. Not
only is Germany the biggest EU member state in terms of population, it
also has the union’s largest and the world’s third largest economy.
Germany is a great power in the heart of Europe, but one that does not
possess nuclear weapons, and whose power therefore largely rests on its
economic strength. An important foundation for economic growth and
stability is secure energy supplies, and for a state the size of Germany this
cannot be underestimated. The crucial issue at the moment appears to be
the nuclear phase-out, which inevitably will lead to an energy shortfall.
Compensating for the energy loss means increasing the use of other forms
of energy, and natural gas is a logical choice for several reasons. First, the
intra-government discord reduces the chance of reconsideration of the
nuclear phase-out plan. Second, renewable energy sources can hardly, at
least not in the short run, compensate for the loss of nuclear power. Third,
Germany’s CO2 emission goals make it difficult to resort to increased use
of other fossil fuels than natural gas, which is environmentally friendlier
than oil and coal. It is therefore not surprising that gas stands out as a
good overall alternative for Berlin. That the gas will come from Russia
seems obvious, considering Russia’s vast proven reserves and geographical
proximity.
These factors are all contemporary, as it were, and they may appear
sufficient to explain why Germany needs and supports Nord Stream.
What is also important, however, is the Russo-German energy history,
which has largely been a stable one. This becomes clearer when
contrasting the Russo-German energy relationship with the Russo-Baltic.
Whereas Nord Stream may be an answer to Germany’s energy dilemma,
the Baltic States have perceived of the pipeline as a problem in itself, and
this is to a large extent due to their history with Moscow. As the analysis
revealed, all the three Baltic States have experienced energy cut-offs or
other strong reactions from Russia following political or commercial
disputes, and this gives them little reason to embrace a pipeline that will
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