Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline

38 Bendik Solum Whist
threat assessment, and by the end of the 1990s, significant reforms had
been proposed to change the Swedish defence concept. According to the
Swedish Ministry of Defence (2004), ‘The Swedish defence system is
undergoing one of the largest military reforms to be undertaken by
Sweden in modern times as it is transformed from a defence force against
invasion to a mobile, flexible operational defence which can both defend
Sweden and take part in international operations.’ Hence, the Swedish
government has deemed that a Cold War-style defence concept is obsolete,
and that the new threats and challenges are best met with a new type
of military. ‘We will be fewer, but better’ seems to be the catchphrase
(Local 2008). Although the fewer soldiers may very well be better, many
believe they do not constitute an army suitable for territorial defence, and
there is currently an intense debate in Sweden about this. Regarding the
strategic implications of the pipeline, Vaahtoranta highlights what can be
considered a contradiction in the Swedish debate:
On the one hand, they have the security concerns [but] at the same
time they are reforming their whole defence concept. They are
giving up their territorial defence because they are saying that
Russia is no longer a threat, and they are putting all their emphasis
on international crisis management. Whereas in Finland we are not
doing that because we are thinking that we still need a territorial
defence in case Russia attacks us. (Vaahtoranta, interview).
Estonian defence analyst Riina Kaljurand (interview) believes that the
Swedes’ focus on military-strategic aspects of the pipeline is indeed a
result of their recent defence reforms. The combination of having Russian
interests coming closer to Sweden, and the fact that ‘they basically have
no army left,’ has led to uncertainty and intensified a debate that may
otherwise have been calmer. Hirdman (interview) also emphasises the
effect that the military reforms have had on the Swedish debate. He
argues that ‘even though Russia is not dangerous for Sweden now, that
does not mean that Sweden should not have a strong military. Nobody
knows what Russia will be like in 50 years.’ 10 As regards the pipeline
debate, however, he does not believe that the military reform is the only
reason for Swedish scepticism. Hirdman also argues that historically,
Sweden’s relationship with Russia has been a strained one, and that the
current debate has more to do with Sweden’s relationship with Russia
than the pipeline itself.
Sweden has a certain Russia complex … just like Poland has a
German complex. So that is what the debate is about: how one
should look at Russia. … It is strange that we are having this
debate in Sweden when they do not have similar debates in, for
instance, Finland or Denmark. Finland, after all, is much closer to
Russia. … In Sweden it is always the issue of Russia being
dangerous. (Hirdman, interview).
10 It should be noted that Hirdman does not believe that Russia will pose a threat
in any immediate future (if at all). Having spent 12 years in Russia, he argues
that Russia is moving towards stronger rule of law, better living standards for
most Russians, and that the recent presidential shift from Putin to Medvedev
shows that there may be a slow, but steady, generational shift in Russian politics.