Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline

22 Bendik Solum Whist
victims of supply interruptions and other strong-arm tactics (Larsson
2007: 7; Baran 2006: 38). The important question is whether such fears
are warranted or not. According to ex-Chancellor Schröder ‘the EU is
hostage of a nationalistic anti-German, anti-Russian policy’ (Welt
2007a), and he cannot understand such fears, as ‘there are no safer energy
suppliers than Russia’ (Spiegel 2007b). Robert Larsson (interview), by
contrast, holds that ‘if Russia had been like Norway, then this would all
be much simpler; Norway does not cut off gas supplies to Sweden, for
instance.’ These statements clearly rest on different assumptions, and the
next section will therefore discuss whether there is reason to be wary
about Russia’s intentions and energy policy.
4.2 Russian Energy Policy: Neo-Imperialism in the Making?
The question of what drives Moscow’s energy policy is a complex one.
Like any other energy exporter, Russia must always make both economic
and political considerations when engaging in infrastructure projects.
With respect to Nord Stream, the crucial question is how these considerations
are balanced. Even though the pipeline will bypass certain states
and connect directly with the German market, this does not immediately
mean that Russia will use energy supplies to blackmail Eastern Europe.
As with any other capability energy only becomes a lever when used as
such (Larsson 2006: 177). Regarding Nord Stream it is therefore important
to ask how Russia sees the rest of Europe. In an interview with the
Russian newspaper Kommersant (2008b), Vice President of the European
Parliament, Marek Siwiec, stated that ‘for Russia, there are ‘good guys’
in the EU, with whom she deals, and ‘bad guys’ with whom she does not
deal … Russian elites want to maintain a certain imperial entourage, and
an empire should have a large army and influence its neighbours.’
Similarly, the Director of the International Centre of Defence Studies in
Estonia, Kadri Liik, argues that:
Russia does not regard Estonia as a country similar to Finland. It is
like we are bound to be someone’s vassals, and now they think that
happens to be the United States. They do not see us as a country
capable of independent thinking. Whereas Finland – and this is
really an exception – Finland is a small country next to Russia that
has managed to convince Russia that they can act independently
… And that does not even have to do with size; I think their opinion
about Poland is the same as the one about us. (Liik, interview).
Although the Kremlin would probably deny that EU members of ‘old’
and ‘new’ Europe are treated differently, or that energy is being used for
political purposes, Larsson (2007: 77-81) claims that Russia has used
energy as a political tool on more than 55 occasions since 1991. The aim
has allegedly been to affect policy changes in the targeted countries, and
the ‘weapons’ used have included supply interruptions, explicit threats,
coercive pricing policies, and hostile take-overs of infrastructure or
companies. For instance, in January 2003 Russia suspended its oil
deliveries to the Latvian port of Ventspils. The official justification for
the cut-off was that the Latvian tariffs were too high, and that it was more
reasonable to ship the oil from the Russian terminal in Primorsk in the
Gulf of Finland. However, critics noticed that the embargo coincided
perfectly with Latvia’s refusal to sell its oil transit company Ventspils