Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline

Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline 53
most Estonians, perhaps to no surprise if one considers their recent history.
Second, there was indeed concern about the environmental impact
of the pipeline, and even though some of the arguments employed may
have been exaggerated, the discussion in chapter 6 revealed that there are
in fact several good reasons to be worried about the Baltic Sea environment
in general and the Gulf of Finland in particular. Third, several
disputes, and notably the recent bronze soldier incident, had played its
part in souring the general Russo-Estonian relationship. Finally, the intragovernment
disagreement, which was indeed driven by domestic politics
and probably influenced by the result of the bronze soldier affair, became
an important driving force in the Estonian debate.
For Sweden and Finland the starting point is somewhat similar: First,
their EEZs have been part of the Nord Stream plans from the beginning,
and although the Swedish EEZ is bigger than the Finnish, they both have
a substantial coastline in the Baltic. Second, neither country would
benefit from the proposed land-based routes, Yamal 2 or Amber. Third,
they are both long-time members of the EU compared to the Baltic States,
and their energy-relations with Russia have been either stable (Finland)
or close to non-existent (Sweden). Fourth, neither state has joined NATO
but has during and after the Cold War preferred a policy of nonalignment.
Finally, both states’ governments have focused solely on the
legal aspects of the EIA procedure and refrain from officially commenting
on other aspects of the project than the environmental ones. As
regards the public debates about Nord Stream, however, Finland and
Sweden are miles apart, and it is therefore interesting to sum up their
debates, or lack thereof, at the same time.
In Sweden, the military-strategic aspects of the pipeline and service platform
were at the core of the public debate that erupted in late 2006. Not
only did independent defence analysts and researchers focus on such
aspects; politicians both from the government and opposition parties
voiced their concerns publicly. In Finland there was never such a
military-strategic debate, and the analysis provided several possible
reasons for this divergence: First of all, the Swedish debate may be
explained by geopolitics. Sweden is used to having Russia at a safe distance
but with Nord Stream Russian interests will come closer to Sweden,
which could lead to increased Russian military presence in Swedish
waters. For Finland, Russia is already so close that a pipeline hardly will
make a strategic difference. Second, the fact that Sweden has scaled
down its military in recent years may contribute to the increased sense of
threat. Finland, by contrast, has not redefined its military concept and still
has an army that is suitable for territorial defence; hence, the Finns may
feel more secure than the Swedes and have little reason to engage in a
military-strategic pipeline debate. Third, it is possible that the Finns,
regardless of their territorial defence capabilities, do not see the militarystrategic
implications of Nord Stream as relevant at all. If this is the case,
they are likely to consider the Swedish debate to be somewhat paranoid,
and the argument that Sweden has a historical Russia-complex becomes
more interesting. Fourth, the reason for Finland’s calmness may be of the
more historical kind, namely that there is some Finlandisation at work in
the Finnish Nord Stream debate. This would mean that other issues than
the purely pragmatic ones related to the EIA procedure are suppressed in
the debate in order not to upset the relationship with Moscow. That Fin-