Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline

28 Bendik Solum Whist
average – at a mere 33.5% – and primary energy supply is dominated by
solid fuels, particularly oil shale, with which Estonia is abundant. The
share of gas in the energy mix (15%) is also low compared to the other
Baltic States, which makes the Estonians less susceptible to energy
pressure than their southern neighbours. Unfortunately for Estonia, this
state-of-affairs cannot last, due to the high CO2 emission levels of oil
shale, and natural gas has been presented as a feasible alternative. The
use of gas has been steadily increasing in the past 20 years, and it is
projected its importance will soon exceed that of oil (20%) in Estonia’s
energy mix (Kasekamp et al. 2006: 7).
Finally, it is worth mentioning that Poland, a state that has also voiced
criticism for being bypassed by Nord Stream, is among the least
dependent EU states in terms of energy, due to its vast hard coal
resources. Import dependency is only 19.9%, and natural gas accounts for
only 12% of the energy mix, making Poland less vulnerable than the
Baltic States.
Table 3: Import Dependence of the Baltic States, Finland & Poland
(2003 & 2006)
Source: EU Commission (2008)
Import dependence,
%
2003
Relative to
EU Average 2006
Import dependence,
%
Relative to
EU Average
Finland 59.2 10.3 54.6 0.8
Estonia 26.3 -22.6 33.5 -20.3
Latvia 62.5 13.6 65.7 11.9
Lithuania 45.2 -3.7 64 10.2
Poland 13.2 -35.7 19.9 -33.9
EU Average 48.9 53.8
Hence, the three Baltic States are either already heavily dependent on
Russian gas, or they will become increasingly dependent very soon, and
this is why the Nord Stream pipeline is of such interest to them. As
discussed in the previous subchapter, their perception of energy security
(or lack thereof) is undoubtedly based on recent historical experience
with Russia. And, surely, if it could be proven that Moscow is pursuing a
neo-imperial foreign policy by means of energy levers, then Nord Stream
could easily be interpreted as a means to put pressure on the Balts by
halting their gas supplies without it affecting Western Europe. The problem
is that motivations are never clear-cut; rather, they are contingent on
interpretations, which will differ greatly depending on the interpreter.
Regardless of foreign policy intentions, however, the Russians may
simply not be able to produce enough gas to cover all of their commitments.
Should Russia then have to choose where to send its scarce gas, it
is fairly safe to assume that Germany will be higher on Moscow’s list
than most Central and Eastern European states. The numbers speak for