Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline

52 Bendik Solum Whist
needs while letting the new EU members deal with the potential problems.
Surely, such an announcement would hardly have been perceived
as politically correct within the EU, which, after all, is in the process of
developing a common energy policy. In any case, Nord Stream appears to
solve so many potential problems for Berlin that it would be strange if
such considerations had not been made. It should also be kept in mind
that the whole debate about a common energy policy, and the related
critique of Germany for choosing a strategy that does not take into
consideration the energy needs of the most recent EU members, is
relatively new. When the plans for Russo-German pipeline through the
Baltic Sea were initiated, the Baltic States and Poland were some six
years away from becoming EU members. And when the European
Commission issued its Green Paper on Energy in March 2006, which
declared inter alia that the Baltic States remain an ‘energy island’, the
memorandum regarding the construction of Nord Stream had been signed
half a year earlier. This is not to suggest that talk of a common energy
policy was entirely new when the Green Paper was issued, but it is
important to keep in mind that as long as there is no common policy for
an issue area, every state will have to find its own solutions.
Nonetheless, the interpretation that Nord Stream divides Europe is very
much a result of Germany’s choice not to include its eastern neighbours
in the pipeline plans, and may also have to do with the newest EU
members’ feeling of not entirely belonging to ‘Europe proper’. Mati
Murd (interiew) in the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs gives an
interesting summary of how the Europe-focused arguments have been
perceived in Estonia:
Maybe one more issue will explain a little bit: The emotional background.
And this is about the rhetoric used by Nord Stream, by
Gazprom, but also by the European partners of the project. All
these companies say that this project is important because it allows
for us to supply Europe, or the European Union, directly. In this
context we are questioning, ‘Where is the border of Europe or
where is the border of the European Union?’ If Gazprom or the
Russian government thinks the EU starts at the German border,
this is not acceptable. This is clearly a policy of divide and rule,
and it is very unfortunate that the European partners of this project
use the same rhetoric.
Clearly, the feeling of not being regarded as fully European should not be
underestimated as a contributing factor in the new EU member states, as
was also reflected in the statements about Nord Stream being a Russo-
German pact.
As mentioned in the analysis, Estonia has less energy-related interest in
Nord Stream than Latvia and Lithuania, and the Estonian opposition
against the project must therefore also be explained by other factors.
Officially, Estonia rejected Nord Stream’s application for a seabed survey
because of a legal contradiction in the application itself. And, as with the
Russian supply interruptions, it cannot be proven that there were other
motivations involved. However, the vibrant public debate preceding the
rejection indicates that numerous other issues influenced the decision.
First of all, the prospect of Russia stepping up its military presence in the
Baltic Sea in order to protect the pipeline was a non-welcome one for