Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline

24 Bendik Solum Whist
significantly less dependent on Russia than the other Baltic States, and
that the Russo-Estonian relationship is less strategic than Russia’s energy
relations with the two other Baltic States. Latvia, for instance, has an
underground storage facility for natural gas, which supplies the St.
Petersburg region during wintertime, and Lithuania transports gas from
Russia to the exclave Kaliningrad region. 6 Nonetheless, the Russo-
Estonian relationship per se is not friction-free, as witnessed when the
Estonian government in April 2007 moved a Red Army war memorial
from the centre of Tallinn to a military cemetery. The act infuriated the
Kremlin, which did little to prevent the Estonian embassy in Moscow
from being besieged by pro-Kremlin youth groups. Not only were the
protestors able to use loudspeakers to blast non-stop Soviet-era military
music into the embassy, they also significantly damaged the outer walls
and attacked the cars of the visiting Swedish ambassador and the
Estonian ambassador (New York Times 2007; Socor 2007). Furthermore,
following the events in Tallinn, Russia significantly reduced its use of
Estonian railways and ports for its export goods, which had a noticeable
economic effect. In June 2007 the port of Tallinn handled 17.5% less
freight than the year before, and by September the volume of Russian
goods being transported with Estonian railways had dropped 30% since
the incidents in April/May, resulting in 200 rail workers losing their jobs.
This development is unlikely to be a result of business fluctuations alone,
and it shows that although the former Soviet states are not equally
dependent in terms of energy, they may be susceptible to other forms of
pressure (Stupachenko 2007). Although it may be difficult to prove that
the economic development after the bronze soldier incident was not
coincidental, the Kremlin’s inaction during the siege of the Estonian
embassy highlights the tension between the two states and underlines
how strongly history and emotions are present in Russo-Estonian (and
Russo-Baltic) relations.
The examples from the Baltic States are a few out of many similar
incidents in Russia’s neighbouring countries. Supply interruptions such as
the ones mentioned above, have primarily occurred in states within the
former Soviet territory (the CIS and the Baltic States), and this has led
some to argue that there is a neo-imperial slant to Russia’s energy policy
(Salukvadze 2006). Hedenskog and Larsson (2007: 9), for instance, argue
that ‘a key strategic goal for Russia is to keep and restore the former CIS
area intact as an exclusive zone of Russian influence.’
However, the former British ambassador to Russia Sir Roderic Lyne
(2006: 9) does not consider ‘neo-imperial’ an accurate description. He
characterises the actions of Russia’s energy companies in the post-Soviet
space a ‘post-imperial hang-over not wholly unlike the British experience
for a generation and more after the Second World War.’ Similarly, the
Director of the independent Institute of Energy Policy in Moscow,
Vladimir Milov (2006: 15) uses the term ‘post-imperial syndrome’ and
describes the Russian energy diplomacy as ‘highly unpredictable.’ In
contrast with those who talk of neo-imperial aspirations, he does not
believe that Moscow has a clear long-term strategy on how to use energy
6 These issues are discussed in depth in the next subchapter.