Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline

Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline 51
bypass them. In contrast with Germany, which has only accidentally felt
the impact of Russian supply cuts, the Baltic States have been the direct
targets, or unlucky victims, of supply interruptions. If Nord Stream is
constructed, Russia could potentially cut supplies to Eastern European
states without it affecting the supply levels to Germany. In light of the
turbulent historical relationships many of these states have with Moscow,
it can hardly come as a surprise that they have been sceptical about the
project. The core problem, however, is that the motivation for Russia’s
past energy actions cannot be proven; they are contingent on interpretation.
And as long as the burden of proof rests on those who have
previously been under Soviet influence, Moscow can quite easily dismiss
their fears as a result of Russophobia. In a sense, then, the historical argument
serves both sides. Similarly, Germany and other Western European
states that have had good energy relations with the Russians can argue
that Russia in fact is a reliable supplier, and far more stable than other
potential gas suppliers, for instance in the Middle East. Hence, whether
Nord Stream in fact represents a threat to the Baltic States’ energy security
is not clear-cut if one only considers what has happened in the past.
As discussed, the crucial issue may in fact be that the Russians, due to
lack of investments in new gas fields and infrastructure, soon will have
problems balancing production, rising domestic demand and growing
export commitments. Should there be a scarcity of gas, it could be less
relevant whether Moscow sees the old and new EU members differently;
someone will have to tackle reduced gas supplies, at least until new fields
and transport infrastructure have been developed. Considering the
German gas market’s size and importance for Russia one can imagine
that it will be given priority over the smaller gas markets in Eastern
Europe; that is, if Nord Stream is constructed so that Russia can supply
Germany directly. Seeing that the three Baltic States are likely to become
increasingly dependent on Russian gas, it appears clearer why they may
have reason to worry. It should be noted that a gas deficit, be it temporary
or permanent, would also affect non-EU states such as the Ukraine and
Belarus.
For Russia, Nord Stream appears to be a win-win project. On the one
hand, if Moscow indeed seeks to use energy as a political lever against
states within its former sphere of influence, then Nord Stream will make
this possible. On the other hand, if a gas deficit is ‘brewing’, then the
offshore pipeline will enable Moscow to supply its allegedly most
important partner in the EU whilst cutting supply levels elsewhere, and
hence, stable relations with Berlin can be maintained.
Interestingly, the prospective scarcity of gas also makes Nord Stream the
best choice for Germany. Being the first recipients of gas from Nord
Stream, the Germans would not have to worry about transit states taking
their shares. During the Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute this is precisely
what happened; Germany experienced what it can be like to be at the end
of the supply chain when the pressure in the pipeline drops. The essential
issue, however, is that Germany, since the Nord Stream project was
announced, has maintained that it is a pan-European rather than a Russo-
German project. None of the official announcements indicate that Berlin
sees a Russian gas deficit coming and therefore wants to cover its own