Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline

34 Bendik Solum Whist
detect in the Finnish Nord Stream discourse. To be sure, there has been
debate in Finland, but as pointed out by Tapani Vaahtoranta (interview),
‘what is typical about our debate is that we only discuss the environmental
aspects of the pipeline.’ In general, the Finnish debate was, and
continues to be, much calmer and less political than in Sweden, the
reasons for which will be discussed shortly.
By contrast, Estonia witnessed a debate much similar to the one in
Sweden, following Finland’s request in the spring of 2007 that Nord
Stream explore an alternative route through the Estonian EEZ. According
to the Director of the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute, Andres Kasekamp,
the Estonian view on Nord Stream had since the Putin-Schröder
agreement in 2005 been generally critical, but since the planned route did
not involve Estonia there was little one could do. However, Finland’s
request for a more southern pipeline route and Nord Stream AG’s subsequent
application to the Estonian government changed this completely.
All of a sudden Estonia was given an opportunity to be a deciding
voice … but we were not prepared because the route was not
initially meant to go through Estonian waters. … So when the
Finns threw it into our hands it came unexpectedly. There was not
much advanced work. (Kasekamp, interview).
This may be one of the reasons why some of the elements from the
Swedish debate were picked up in Estonia, and fuelled the debate there,
which reached its peak in the early autumn of 2007. The platform in the
Swedish EEZ was, of course, no issue for the Estonians, but there were
nevertheless military-strategic arguments present in the debate. Indeed,
there was fear that the pipeline could become ‘one big spying infrastructure,’
and, perhaps more importantly, ‘there was no argument that
could trump … Putin’s own statement about increasing the Russian Baltic
Fleet’s presence near the pipeline’ (Kasekamp, interview). On 25 October
2006, in a televised interview, President Putin had talked about how the
Russian Navy was about to be significantly upgraded through the construction
of new vessels, and regarding the Baltic pipeline he declared
that:
The Baltic Fleet also has the task of ensuring our economic interests
in the Baltic Sea. We have enough of them. … [Nord Stream]
is a major project, very important for the country’s economy, and
indeed for all Western Europe. And of course we are going to
involve and use the opportunities offered by the navy to resolve
environmental, economic, and technical problems because since
the Second World War no one knows better than seamen how to
operate on the bottom of the Baltic Sea. (Vladimir Putin, cited in
Hirdman 2007: 3).
Not unlike the statement by the Russian ambassador to Sweden, Putin’s
declaration about possible new areas of work for the Russian Navy did
not help promote Nord Stream – at least not in Estonia and Sweden.
Quite the contrary, it significantly raised the level of concern and ‘proved
right’ those who may have appeared the most paranoid about Russian
intentions. Although the Russian president focused mostly on how the
Navy could help with regard to ecological issues during construction of
the pipeline, and made reference to other states’ navies performing similar
tasks, it was the prospect of increased military presence that seemed to