Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline

36 Bendik Solum Whist
public debates of these states, and this is where geopolitics must be
supplemented by history.
Few would deny that history plays its part in shaping internal political
debate and external political ‘behaviour’ of states, but in the case of
Finland and Estonia and their relationship with Russia, the importance of
history is particularly visible. Tomas Ries and Tapani Vaahtoranta (interviews)
point out that Finland’s experience during the Cold War is
especially important. During these difficult years the Finns acquired crucial
knowledge about how they could deal with the Russians, and whilst
most Estonians would claim that there is no negotiating with Russia,
there is in Finland a feeling that one can in fact secure Finnish vital
interests through dialogue with Moscow. This Finnish confidence,
however, does not imply that everything could be debated publicly during
the Cold War. On the contrary, a prerequisite for Helsinki’s negotiations
with Moscow was that some issue areas were never up for discussion. It
was a relationship with pragmatics at the core, in which it was especially
important for the Finns to pick their fights carefully, or more precisely,
make sure they did not accidentally pick any fights. Through strong selfcensorship
in the media, warranted and wanted by the government and
long-term President Urho Kekkonen (1956-81), Finland was able to
create a modus vivendi with the Soviet Union (Singleton 1985: 530). The
process through which such a policy emerges is commonly known as
Finlandisation, but it can apply to other countries as well. In general, the
term refers to a situation where a powerful state has great influence over a
smaller (neighbouring) state, which takes on a highly accommodating
attitude in order to secure its own survival. In the Finnish case, selfcensorship
was a main component, and ‘if Finlandisation does matter
today, it is mainly because of the political culture it created in Finland
itself’ (Hanhimäki 2000: 304). In fact, it can be argued that the Finnish
Nord Stream debate reflects a ‘re-Finlandisation of Finland’:
If you look at the public debate in Finland about Russia, more of
our debate has started to resemble the debate we had during the
Cold War. This Finlandisation approach, I think, has come back.
And we are much more careful when we discuss Russia now than
just some years ago. As I said, when we discuss the pipeline, we
only discuss the environmental issues. (Vaahtoranta, interview).
As indicated earlier, the fact that the environmental impact of the pipeline
is the only thing being discussed in Finland may very well be because this
is the only aspect that Finns are really worried about. But researchers in
Finland and elsewhere are not entirely convinced that this is the case. For
instance, it is argued that when the Russians first started discussing the
possibility of a Baltic pipeline, there was indeed concern within the Finnish
government, as this would bring Russia’s strategic interests further
out in the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic Sea, which in turn would lead to
increased Russian military presence. ‘But this, of course, is something
that would never be announced publicly. Because history has taught the
Finns that if you want to get anywhere with Russia, you must act cautiously’
(Ries, interview). So maybe the concern about Russia stepping
up its military activities was just as present in Finland as in Sweden,
although not visible in the public debate. Research fellow at the Swedish
Institute of International Affairs, Jakub Swiecicki (interview), supports