Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline

Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline 47
Germans would have to compensate by using other forms of energy, and
in light of the nuclear phase-out discussed in chapter 3.2, this would most
likely be coal (IEA 2007: 9). Nord Stream representative Dirk von Ameln
(2008: 2) has emphasised that natural gas has the lowest CO2 emission
level of all fossil fuels – 40% lower than coal – and that ‘therefore, it has
to be regarded as a bridge towards the sustainable era.’ Admittedly, the
latter argument is debatable, but if the choice is between coal and gas,
then von Ameln has a point. With reference to the Swedish CO2argument,
he has stated that ‘for Sweden, there are not as many direct
advantages of the project as for the countries that are to use the gas. But
since the environmental problems are global, Sweden will also reap the
benefits of reduced emissions of CO2’ (DN 2007b). In light of this,
Sahlin’s argument, despite being theoretically correct regarding emissions,
appears a bit selective. Hirdman , for instance, argues that:
The important environmental question of the Baltic Sea is not the
gas pipeline but the transport of 100 million tons of Russian oil
from Primorsk. … Statistically, there will be a collision at some
point, and then you will have an environmental problem in the
Baltic. … So the friends of the environment should focus a bit
more on oil transport and a bit less on the gas pipeline. (Hirdman,
interview).
Walhbäck (interview) believes that the domestic political situation in
Sweden may be the key to understand how the Swedish government positions
itself on the Nord Stream issue. In view of the scepticism voiced by
the opposition and the public, the government is probably best served by
not making any final decisions regarding the EIA before the upcoming
election in 2010. If a construction permit is given before then, and the
work causes environmental problems, it will reduce the government’s
chance of re-election.
A similar ‘domestic politics edge’ can be traced in the Estonian debate
about Nord Stream AG’s application for a seabed survey. According to
Kasekamp (interview), the debate and the subsequent rejection of the
application were very much a result of tensions within the government.
Key politicians in the coalition government, 12 such as Prime Minister
Andrus Ansip and Foreign Minister Urmas Paet, were initially intent on
granting the exploration permit, as this was considered the best move
from a foreign policy point of view. With the bronze soldier incident of
April 2007 in fresh memory, they thought it would be wise for Estonia to
keep a low profile and not choose any action that could appear Russophobic.
Their problem, however, was that Mart Laar, former Estonian
Prime Minister (1992-94 and 1999-2002) and current leader of one of the
other governing parties, made the pipeline issue his own personal crusade.
By quoting the environmental arguments of Endel Lippmaa (for
instance that of the 50 Hiroshima bombs, but also other less apocalyptic
12 The government was elected in March 2007 and is a three-party coalition of
the Estonian Reform Party (31 mandates in the election), the Pro Patria and Res
Publica Union (19 mandates), and the Social Democratic Party (10 mandates).
Both the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister represent the Reform Party.