Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline

54 Bendik Solum Whist
land, unlike Sweden, imports all its gas from Russia may also influence
Helsinki’s attitude towards Moscow. As was noted in the analysis, it is
very difficult to ascertain whether Finland has become ‘re-Finlandised’,
or whether the military issues are simply considered irrelevant. Finally,
both Sweden and Finland may be reluctant to work against Berlin’s
interests because of their common EU-affiliation. By and large, the
difference between the Finnish and Swedish debates can be explained by
some contemporary factors, but the picture becomes richer when the
historical elements are included in the equation.
What the Swedish and Finnish debates have had in common, which has
also been the case for most of the other littoral states, is a considerable
concern for the Baltic Sea environment. Even the Nord Stream consortium
has focused extensively on preserving the Baltic environment during
construction of the pipeline, which is probably an appreciation of the fact
that without such an environmental focus the project’s chance of success
would be significantly smaller. Nonetheless, as chapter 6 revealed,
Sweden and Finland may have good reasons to demand the strictest
environmental assessments before any construction begins. Considering
that they have nothing to gain from Nord Stream from an energyperspective,
but may lose significantly in case of an environmental
catastrophe, their environmental concern may not appear as exaggerated.
It is interesting to note that Sweden has already sent the first EIA back to
Nord Stream because it was considered incomplete. The Finns could
potentially do the same when their EIA is ready, thus not expediting
construction but rather slowing the process down and increasing the cost
for the consortium. There are indeed those who hope that Finland, or
perhaps more likely Sweden, will keep delaying the project through the
EIA process by demanding more thorough assessments, thus driving the
price tag upwards, and that the pipeline consortium in the end will have
to abandon the whole offshore idea and settle with a less costly landbased
route (Swiecicki and Wahlbäck interviews). Whether this is a likely
scenario does not fall within the scope of this report, but suffice it to say
that the possibility exists. If the Swedish and Finnish governments are in
reality opposed to Nord Stream, the most efficient way of working
against it without angering Moscow and Berlin may be by focusing solely
on the environmental issues, which, after all, concern the Baltic Sea as
such and not only narrow national interests.
This report has hopefully made clearer why the interpretations of Nord
Stream, since the project was announced, have differed to such an extent
in the different littoral states of the Baltic Sea. Contemporary energyissues
are naturally a key factor; that is, who needs gas and where they
can get it. But, as has been shown, the historical energy relations of the
states in question are also of great importance for how Nord Stream has
been interpreted. The environmental concern can be seen as a somewhat
contemporary factor but it is nevertheless linked to the history of the
region, both in relation to dumped munitions, pollution, and Russia’s
environmental track record. Finally, the military-strategic concern about
the pipeline can in part be explained by geography and the fact that Nord
Stream brings Russian interests further out in the Baltic Sea, but
essentially the issue is deeply embedded in the history of the region, in
particular Russia’s relations with the smaller littoral states.