Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline

Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline 15
issue, she would find herself pressured by ‘a strong business lobby that
wants good relations with Russia no matter what’ (Lucas 2008: 189, 226).
In light of the above, Germany’s own needs can hardly be trivialised
when assessing the rationale behind, and arguments for, the Nord Stream
pipeline. And even though there is a persistent European focus amongst
pipeline proponents, one might ask whether Nord Stream would ever
have left the drawing board had it not been for the current energy
dilemma facing Germany. Although certain factions within the German
political sphere, as well as analysts outside Germany, are concerned
about too much dependence on Russia, the current government deadlock
makes Nord Stream stand out as a good solution. Furthermore, the
dependence-argument is not a one-sided one, and the question of mutual
dependence – or interdependence – has been central in this regard. The
following section will explore how the concept of interdependence can
serve as a normative argument when discussing EU-Russia relations
generally, and Nord Stream specifically.
3.3 Overarching Assumption: Harmony through
Interdependence
In an October 2006 interview, President Putin was asked if he could
understand the concern some Germans have about becoming too dependent
on Russian gas supplies, to which he responded:
No, I don’t understand that. It is artificially politicised. There are
people that are trying to heat up this issue to gain from it politically.
These people are either provocateurs or very stupid. I say this
quite often, even if it sounds harsh. It is, however, the fact that
when we have a common pipeline system, we are equally dependent
on each other. (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2006a).
The interdependence argument is not a new one, neither with regard to
gas transmission systems, nor related to trade in general. What Putin
refers to in his statement is that pipelines, once constructed, are stationary
and do not allow for the gas to be sent elsewhere on a short notice.
Although Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) can be quickly redirected, it is
currently no competitor to pipeline gas over shorter distances. Because of
the expensive liquefaction process, as well as the need for specially
designed ships, LNG is only a real competitor to pipeline gas when the
transportation distance is over 4000 km onshore, or 1500-2000 km for
sub-sea pipelines (Kasekamp et al. 2006: 22). Furthermore, LNG currently
only accounts for some 10% of the global gas supplies, and it is not
likely to compete with pipeline gas any time soon (Helm 2007: 15-16).
Proedrou (2007: 343) has emphasised that EU-Russia energy relations are
characterised by lack of feasible alternatives for both sides. About 50% of
all Russian energy exports go to the EU, which in turn has Russia as its
decidedly most important supplier. In 2006, the EU imported some 33%
of its crude oil and 42% of its natural gas from Russia. By comparison,
the corresponding numbers for Norway, which is the second-largest exporter
of oil and gas to the Union, were 16% and 24% (EU Commission
2008). Had Russia had the infrastructure in place to divert its energy
sources to the expanding markets in Asia, the EU would have a better
reason to worry. However, since this is currently not the case, Proedrou