Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline
Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline
Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
<strong>Nord</strong> <strong>Stream</strong>: <strong>Not</strong> <strong>Just</strong> a <strong>Pipeline</strong> 35<br />
interest people the most. Thus, when Putin was quoted in the subsequent<br />
Estonian debate, he was rarely cited in full (Mäe 2008), and it more or<br />
less became a mantra that ‘Putin said so,’ and ‘that was such a strong,<br />
emotional argument that nothing could counter it’ (Kasekamp, interview).<br />
Why, then, can no similar tendency be found in Finland when it was so<br />
strong in Estonia and to a considerable extent also in Sweden? In the<br />
following subchapter it shall be shown that a combination of history and<br />
geopolitics may help explain the difference.<br />
5.3 The Role of History and Geopolitics<br />
It is necessary to note that tracing and explaining ‘lack of debate’ may not<br />
be as straight-forward as elucidating aspects of a full-blown debate.<br />
When an argument is not present in a discourse it could be because it is<br />
not considered relevant by the actors involved, or it could be because this<br />
particular aspect is actively suppressed in the debate for other reasons. As<br />
regards the Finnish <strong>Nord</strong> <strong>Stream</strong> debate and why it has not involved<br />
military-strategic issues, Vaahtoranta (interview) proposes two different<br />
explanations:<br />
Either we [the Finns] are so concerned with Russia that we do not<br />
want to raise the other dimensions of the pipeline. Or … it doesn’t<br />
change our position in any way regarding Russia. Russia is already<br />
so close to Finland. It doesn’t bring Russia any closer. … If you<br />
look at the public debate, it is impossible to say which explanation<br />
is correct.<br />
It can be argued that the geopolitics of the Baltic region plays a decisive<br />
role in shaping public debates and sense of threat. For the Finns, who<br />
share a 1340 km border with the eastern giant, a pipeline will hardly<br />
make a military-strategic difference. By contrast, <strong>Nord</strong> <strong>Stream</strong> would undoubtedly<br />
bring Russian interests closer to Sweden, perhaps particularly<br />
if the platform were to be realised. Thus, geopolitics may be a contributing<br />
factor that sheds light on the Finnish-Swedish differences, but it does<br />
not help explain why the Estonian debate differed so much from the<br />
Finnish. Estonia and Finland are both small EU-states, 8 they both border<br />
on Russia, and they are both 100% reliant on the eastern giant for their<br />
gas supplies. Nonetheless, the Estonian debate had more similarities with<br />
the Swedish than with the Finnish in that it was very heated and political,<br />
and involved more than environmental issues. Surely, one must keep in<br />
mind that the official positions of Finland and Sweden are much alike in<br />
that their governments have claimed to be quite neutral with regard to<br />
<strong>Nord</strong> <strong>Stream</strong> and will only take a stand on the legal questions and the<br />
EIA procedure. Similarly, the Estonian government’s rejection of the<br />
application for a seabed survey was officially based on a legal contradiction<br />
in the application itself. 9 The main difference, therefore, lies in the<br />
8 Of course, Finland is much bigger than Estonia in terms of both population (4x<br />
bigger) and territory (7.5x bigger), but compared to large states like Germany<br />
and Russia they are both small.<br />
9 Regardless of official explanations, however, several Estonian researchers have<br />
claimed that the Estonian rejection of the application was much more complex<br />
(as will be explored in subchapter 6.3).